JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 · No.1 · 2012

SEARCHING THE CLOUDS
WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
NEED TO GET THEIR HEADS OUT OF
THE CLOUD AND 0BT AIN A WARRANT
BEFORE ACCESSING A CLOUD
NETWORK ACCOUNT
Sara J. Kohls*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing is the newest big thing in remote computing
technology. It allows a user to store his files and media on distant
remote servers, the "cloud," in lieu of saving his materials to his local,
personal hard drive. 1 The user can then access his data from any
device with internet access. 2 The mobility of a user's personal files
poses a problem for law enforcement agents who, armed with valid
warrants, wish to search a suspect's computer. There is a high
probability that a user has not saved his incriminating computer files
on his personal computer's physical hard drive3 if he uses the cloud to
store his data.
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See ANTHONY T. VELTE, TOBY J. VELTE & ROBERT ELSENPETER, CLOUD
COMPUTING, A PRACTICAL APPROACH 3-22 (McGraw-Hill
2010)
[hereinafter VELTE] (providing a general overview of cloud computing).
2.

Id. at 135 ("If you store your data on the cloud, you can get at it from
any location that has Internet access .... Workers don't need to use the
same computer to access data nor do they have to carry around physical
storage devices.").

3.

See Dong Ngo, Digital storage basics, Part 1: Internal storage vs.
memory, CNET (Nov. 7, 2012, 2:59 PM), [hereinafter Ngo]
http://howto.cnet.com/8301-33088_39-57545421/digital-storage-basicspart-1-internal-storage-vs-memory / (explaining that a hard drive is
essentially a 'box containing a few magnetic disks,' which is connected
to a computer or laptop via an interface); see also Dong Ngo, Digital
storage basics, part 2: External drive vs. NAB server, CNET (Nov. 16,
2012, 8:50 PM), [hereinafter Ngo II] http://howto.cnet.com/830133088_39-5 7549884/ digital-storage-basics-part-2-external-drive-vs-nasserver / (describing portable external servers, which connect to the
computer and "become a storage extension of the host.").
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. . Guidance from existing physical computer search doctrine is

ln~uted, yet on~ thing is clear: a warrant for a physical computer hard
d:1ve does .no.t mclud~ the right to search the cloud. In the simple yet
highly realistic scenano described below, a law enforcement agent may
not. know what his next steps are when he encounters a computer
durmg a lawful search and suspects that the user may have utilized
the cloud network. This Note argues that the answer is simple: the
Fourth Amendment protects the cloud, thus law enforcement officers
mu.st obtain ~ separate warrant to search a cloud network account.
This pr?tection. is apparent when the Katz v. United States
expectation of pnvacy test 4 is applied.
Recently, Justice Sotomayor stated in United States v. Jones:
I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the
v:rarrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web
site they had visited in the law week, or month, or year .... I
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to
some member of the public for a limited purpose is for that
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 5
. Justice Sotomayor's statement indicates that the expectation of
This Note argues that the
trad1t10nal warrant exceptions, such as the third party doctrine and
consent s:arches, ha~e no pla.ce in cloud network searches in light of
the evolvmg expectat10n of pnvacy in the technological era.
When a police officer enters a house with a valid search warrant
and sees a computer, it is not always clear what his next steps should
be. Does the warrant include the computer? What exactly can he
access on that computer? How does the officer determine what files
he can look for and where he can look for them? To make matters
w~rse, these are questions that an officer faces before he finds
evidence. that the suspect 's computing has gone beyond the confines of
the physical hard drive.
Now, we add the cloud network to the confusion. Consider the
following hypothetical:
After an in-depth investigation, the police establish probable
cause s~pporting a search warrant to search the suspect 's computer
hard dnve for data related to an alleged crime. To obtain the
war~ant, . the officers present affidavits to a neutral and detached
~a~rn~rate. P~r the particularity requirement, the proposed warrant
is h~mted to fi!~s save~ on the suspect's physical computer. The
mag1str~te specifically limits the scope of the warrant to the physical
hard dnve and grants it.
pnv~~y must evolve with technology.

4.

389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

5.

132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012).
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Upon arnvmg at the suspect's residence, the police show the
suspect the warrant and gain access to his computer. The police do
not find any evidence on the computer's physical hard drive, but a
computer specialist notes that there is evidence that the suspect has
been using a cloud network account. 6 The police log into the
suspect 's cloud account without his consent and find hundreds of
incriminating files. He is arrested.
After indictment, the defendant's attorney files a motion to
suppress. The basis for the motion is that the seized data was beyond
the scope of the warrant; therefore the search and seizure was
unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. The defendant
argues the scope of the warrant limited the police to searching his
physical hard drive, and that he did not grant the police authority to
access his cloud storage account. Further, the police exceeded their
authorization because the seized files were not stored on the
defendant's computer, but on servers located hundreds of miles away.
The defense attorney concludes the police should have obtained a
separate warrant to search the cloud.
This Note argues that the Fourth Amendment does not permit an
officer to access files that were never saved on a suspect 's computer
hard drive without a valid search warrant specific to cloud network
storage account.
The reasonable expectation of privacy test,
established in Katz,7 protects the files and media that a user stores on
the cloud. The use of the cloud network can be compared to search
regulations of the United States Postal Service (USPS): although a
sender entrusts his mail to the third-party USPS, the government is
required to obtain a warrant before searching the packages. 8
Similarly, law enforcement must obtain a warrant before accessing
documents or files saved on the cloud. Further, a cloud network user
does not lose his expectation of privacy the way a person does when
he places his trash on the curbside for pickup. The important
distinction is that a person leaves his trash out knowing that

6.

This Note assumes that law enforcement wishes to search data saved
only on the cloud. If there was a back-up copy saved on the computer,
the warrant would cover the search.

7.

389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual subjective
expectation of privacy and, second that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable.").

8.

See infra Section III(A)(l)(a) for a description of the law regulating
search warrants and the mail.
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somebody may go through it; 9 a cloud user does not have the same
belief. 10
This Note discusses the Fourth Amendment's protection of the
cloud by first explaining exactly what the cloud is and how it differs
from other technology, thus establishing why existing computer search
methodologies do not apply to the cloud. Therefore, the law must
adhere to three principles. First, pursuant to Katz, there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud. Second, executing a
warrant to search a physical computer, pursuant to existing computer
search doctrine, does not encompass the cloud. Third, law
enforcement officers cannot apply an exception to circumvent the
warrant requirement.
When police officers have a valid warrant to search a home
computer, the search must start and end there. If the police find
evidence that the user has a cloud account, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits them from immediately accessing the cloud. The additional
search warrant is necessary because there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the cloud. Subsequently, a law enforcement agent has
only one option when he wants to search a cloud network account: get
a warrant.

simply, cloud computing is a metaphor for the "newest" way to use
the Internet. 12 Despite this initial confusion, nearly sixty-nine percent
of Americans have used the cloud network in some fashion. 13 Both
individuals and companies utilize the cloud in a similar manner. In
lieu of a traditional internal server, 14 the cloud network allows the
user to run services and programs on an external server, 15 which
essentially allows the user to outsource these processes. 16 Thus, users
are switching to cloud computing because it provides the same
traditional type of networking and file storage capacities for a fraction
of the price.17 In fact, individuals and businesses alike are buying
cheaper and less sophisticated machines because large hard drives are
no longer necessary; users can stream programs, such as word
processing or online gaming, directly from the cloud. 18
Similarly, utilizing cloud storage involves exactly what the name
suggests-storing files and media in a personal account on the cloud
rather than on a local system. 19 Notable cloud storage providers
include Dropbox, 20 Amazon, 21 Apple, 22 and Google, 23 but there are

II.

WHAT IS THE CLOUD?

To understand why the Fourth Amendment protects the cloud,
one must understand what the cloud is, why using the cloud is
different than using a personal computer, and what sort of privacy
implications are involved in cloud network usage.
A.

12.

See VELTE, supra note 1, at 3 (describing the cloud network, how it
works, the different uses for the cloud, and the various providers, among
related things).

13.

Horrigan, supra note 10 (showing users' different concerns regarding
privacy of their data).

14.

See Ngo II, supra note 3 (explaining that internal servers, or 'network
attached storage' serves the purpose to "connectO to a network and
make its storage space available to all devices in the same local
network.").

15.

See VELTE, supra note 1, at 4, 7-8 ("[C]loud computing is a construct
that allows you to access applications that actually reside at a location
other than your computer or other Internet-connected device; most
often, this will be a distant datacenter." At datacenter is a collection of
servers that may be located anywhere, and not necessarily in the same
location).

16.

See Roger Cheng, 'Cloud Computing': What Exactly Is It, Anyway?,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2010, at R2 (detailing the numerous uses of cloud
computing for businesses).

17.

See VELTE, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining how business save money by
using the cloud, not only by reducing the costs of buying and licensing
programs, but also by reducing the cost of utilities and eliminating the
need to buy some programs all together).

18.

Id. at 7 (describing the concept of a "thin" client (computer) and why
use of this type of machine is becoming increasingly popular).

19.

Id. at 135 - 151 (providing a generalized overview of cloud storage).

20.

DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).

Overview

Many people, even those with a technological background,
struggle to understand the cloud's purpose and functions. 11 Put
9.

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (noting that thus,
there would be no reasonable expectation of privacy in the items they
discarded).

10.

John B. Horrigan, Data Memo, Use of Cloud Computing Applications
and Services, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (Sept. 12, 2008)
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2008/Use-of-CloudComputing-Applications-and-Services /Data-Memo.aspx
[hereinafter
Horrigan] (reporting high levels of concern from cloud network users
when asked about how they would feel if the cloud network provider
took various actions with their data).

11.

interesting thing about cloud computing is that we've redefined cloud
computing to include everything that that we already do.").

In fact, as recently as 2008, when cloud computing was "new," even the
high-profile players in the technological industry believed that the cloud
was just "rebranding" current technology. See Dan Farber, Oracle's
Ellison nails cloud computing, CNET NEWS (Sept. 26, 2008, 12:09 PM)
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13953_3-10052188-80.html
(reporting
Ellison's disclosure of the "truth" about cloud computing: "[t]he
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many others. Recently, these companies have brought the cloud into
24
the public eye. The services cloud service providers offer range from
a simplistic on-stop "shopping" experience to more complicated
systems, requiring multiple stops for a complete cloud-computing
experience. 25
Depending on which cloud network service provider a user
chooses, his files or documents that are saved on the cloud are
located on remote servers located all over the world. 26 This essentially
allows the user to treat his cloud account as a portable hard drive to
retrieve his documents and files from any computer with Internet
27
access.
In some cases, the user does not have to download
additional software to his computer to access the files he has stored
28
on the cloud.
For example, Dropbox users simply log into their
account via Dropbox's homepage in order to access their stored
21.

AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/clouddrive/learnmore/ref=sa menu acd Im
2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012); see, e.g., Rob Pegoraro~ Ama;;n Cloud
Player puts your music on the Web, WASH. POST (March 29, 2011, 5:58
AM) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/faster-forward/post/
amazon-cloud-player-puts-your-music-on-the-web /2011 /03 /29 /
AFBJ5jsB_blog.html; see also, e.g., Stu Woo & Geoffrey A. Fowler,
Amazon Cloud Boosts Fire, WALL ST. J. Sept. 30, 2011, at B2 (detailing
the uses of Amazon's "cloud," which Amazon not only rents to
companies such as Netflix, Inc., and Zynga, Inc., but also uses it to
power searches on the Kindle Fire through the internet browser
Amazon Silk).
'

22.

APPLE ICLOUD, http://www.apple.com/icloud/ (last visited Mar. 26,
2012); see, e.g., David Goldman, What to Expect from Apple's iCloud,
CNN (June 1, 2011, 3:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
~Oll/06/01/tech11:o.logy/apple_icloud/index.htm (discussing the way the
iCloud may be utilized to store and play music).
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documents. 29 Users do not need to install any additional programs on
a computer to access their Dropbox account; rather, they can access
their data on public computers with relative ease.
However, Dropbox operates differently from other cloud providers.
Dropbox saves copies of a user's files or media to the user's "base"
computer, the computer to which the user has installed the Dropbox
software. 30 Other cloud network programs do not have this feature.
Cloud providers such as Google Drive allow users to create, modify,
and save entire document on the cloud. 31 Google Drive provides an
entire word processing program to its users, and the user never has to
save the document to his personal computer. 32
B.

Why People Use the Cloud Network

It is estimated that by 2020, "most" people will use the cloud
network to access software applications online, as well as to store and
access their data, in lieu of using traditional personal computers. 33
This is because of the cloud network's ease and convenience; when
data is stored on the cloud, a user can access his materials "via an
internet link" from whatever computer or device he wishes. 34 So long
as the user has access to a "web-based interface," which essentially
includes any device that is capable of internet access; such as a
laptop, smartphone, tablet, or netbook, he may store or access data
on the cloud. 35 Furthermore, the cloud provides a simple way for
users to back up their data in another location. If, in an extreme
scenario, a tornado ripped through a home and destroyed a user's
29.

Id. (Log-In box).

30.

See DROPBOX: FEATURES, https://www.dropbox.com/features (last
visited Mar. 26, 2012) ("Any file you save to Dropbox also instantly
saves to your computers, phones, and the Dropbox website.").

23.

E.g., G_OOGLE: ~PPS FOR BUSINESS, http://www.google.com/apps/intl/
en/busmess/off1ceconnect.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).

31.

See GOOGLE DRIVE, http://www.google.com/drive/start/apps.html#
product=docs (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).

24.

See Brian X. Chen, From iCloud to Dropbox: 5 Cloud Computing
Services
Co:npared,
WIRED
(June
20,
2011,
3:05
PM),
http//www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/06/cloud-services-compared
[heremafter Chen] (comparing the five major cloud computing services).

32.

See id. (describing the Google Docs feature of Google Drive, which
allows the creation and editing of documents entirely on the cloud).

33.

Janna Quitney Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Cloud
Computing, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (June 11, 2010)
available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports /2010 /The-future-of-cloudcomputing/ Overview .aspx. (basing this theory off an internet study).

34.

See VELTE, supra note 1, at 135 ("As with other cloud services, you can
access the data stored on the cloud via an internet link."); see also
Chen, supra note 24 ("Have music on your PC that you want to listen
to on your smartphone? Boom, stream it from the cloud. Want to
access a document on another computer? Barn, grab it from your webconnected "cloud" drive.").

35.

VELTE, supra note 1, at 136 (describing the use of cloud computing
technology).

25.

See id. (comparing Amazon ("Amazon's Cloud Drive is as
straightforward as a cloud service gets: It's just an online storage
locker.") to Google ("Google's "cloud" suite can be confusing: There's no
one-stop destination that hosts all your media.")).

26.

See VELTE, supra note 1, at 8 ("Amazon has their cloud solution in
servers all over the world.").

27.

See id. at 137 (listing various cloud providers and the types of files they
specialize in storing).

28.

See e.g., DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com.
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many others. Recently, these companies have brought the cloud into
24
the public eye. The services cloud service providers offer range from
a simplistic on-stop "shopping" experience to more complicated
systems, requiring multiple stops for a complete cloud-computing
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Depending on which cloud network service provider a user
chooses, his files or documents that are saved on the cloud are
located on remote servers located all over the world. 26 This essentially
allows the user to treat his cloud account as a portable hard drive to
retrieve his documents and files from any computer with Internet
27
access.
In some cases, the user does not have to download
additional software to his computer to access the files he has stored
28
on the cloud.
For example, Drop box users simply log into their
account via Dropbox's homepage in order to access their stored
21.

AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/clouddrive/learnmore/ref=sa_menu acd lrn
2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012); see, e.g., Rob Pegoraro, Ama~n Cloud
Player puts your music on the Web, WASH. POST (March 29, 2011, 5:58
AM) http://www. washingtonpost .com/blogs /faster-forward/ post/
amazo11;-cloud-player-puts-your-music-on-the-web/2011/03/29/
AFBJ5JsB_blog.html; see also, e.g., Stu Woo & Geoffrey A. Fowler,
Amazon Cloud Boosts Fire, WALL ST. J. Sept. 30, 2011, at B2 (detailing
the uses of Amazon's "cloud," which Amazon not only rents to
companies such as N etflix, Inc., and Zynga, Inc., but also uses it to
power searches on the Kindle Fire through the internet browser
Amazon Silk).
'

22.

APPLE ICLOUD, http://www.apple.com/icloud/ (last visited Mar. 26,
2012); see, e.g., David Goldman, What to Expect from Apple's iCloud,
CNN (June 1, 2011, 3:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
~011/06/01/technology/apple_icloud/index.htm (discussing the way the
iCloud may be utilized to store and play music).

23.

E.g., c:ooGLE: ~PPS FOR BUSINESS, http://www.google.com/apps/intl/
en/busmess/off1ceconnect.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).

24.

See Brian X. Chen, From iCloud to Dropbox: 5 Cloud Computing
Services
Co:npared,
WIRED
(June
20,
2011,
3:05
PM),
http/ /www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/06/cloud-services-compared
[heremafter Chen] (comparing the five major cloud computing services).

25.

26.
27.
28.

See id. (comparing Amazon ("Amazon's Cloud Drive is as
straightforward as a cloud service gets: It's just an online storage
locker.") to Google ("Google's "cloud" suite can be confusing: There's no
one-stop destination that hosts all your media.")).
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documents. 29 Users do not need to install any additional programs on
a computer to access their Dropbox account; rather, they can access
their data on public computers with relative ease.
However, Dropbox operates differently from other cloud providers.
Dropbox saves copies of a user's files or media to the user's "base"
computer, the computer to which the user has installed the Drop box
software. 30 Other cloud network programs do not have this feature.
Cloud providers such as Google Drive allow users to create, modify,
and save entire document on the cloud. 31 Google Drive provides an
entire word processing program to its users, and the user never has to
save the document to his personal computer. 32
B.

29.

Id. (Log-In box).

30.

See DROPBOX: FEATURES, https://www.dropbox.com/features (last
visited Mar. 26 2012) ("Any file you save to Dropbox also instantly
'
saves to your computers,
phones, and the Dropbox website. ") .

31.

See GOOGLE DRIVE, http://www.google.com/drive/start/apps.html#
product=docs (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).

32.

See id. (describing the Google Docs feature of Google Drive, which
allows the creation and editing of documents entirely on the cloud).

33.

Janna Quitney Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Cloud
Computing, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (June 11, 2010)
available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/The-future-of-cloudcomputing/Overview.aspx. (basing this theory off an internet study).

34.

See VELTE, supra note 1, at 135 ("As with other cloud services, you can
access the data stored on the cloud via an internet link."); see also
Chen, supra note 24 ("Have music on your PC that you want to listen
to on your smartphone? Boom, stream it from the cloud. Want to
access a document on another computer? Barn, grab it from your webconnected "cloud" drive.").

35.

VELTE, supra note 1, at 136 (describing the use of cloud computing
technology).

See id. at 137 (listing various cloud providers and the types of files they
specialize in storing).

174

Why People Use the Cloud Network

It is estimated that by 2020, "most" people will use the cloud
network to access software applications online, as well as to store and
access their data, in lieu of using traditional personal computers. 33
This is because of the cloud network's ease and convenience; when
data is stored on the cloud, a user can access his materials "via an
internet link" from whatever computer or device he wishes. 34 So long
as the user has access to a "web-based interface," which essentially
includes any device that is capable of internet access; such as a
laptop, smartphone, tablet, or netbook, he may store or access data
on the cloud. 35 Furthermore, the cloud provides a simple way for
users to back up their data in another location. If, in an extreme
scenario, a tornado ripped through a home and destroyed a user's

See VELTE, supra note 1, at 8 ("Amazon has their cloud solution in
servers all over the world.").

See e.g., DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com.
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computer and local back-ups, a copy of his personal files would still be
safe, stored on a remote server miles away. 36
Moreover, users may have access to nearly unlimited space on the
cloud. Users can sign up for the basic free package from the cloud
provider, which allows them to store anywhere from one to five
gigabytes 37 of material. 38 Alternatively, consumers with greater needs
may choose to purchase as much as sixteen terabytes of storage from
a cloud provider. 39 This means that a user could store all of his files
and media on the cloud.

Security Terms state that the only information it will view about
users' files is the file's metadata, which includes the file's name or
location. 44 Google's privacy policy is much more complicated, but
generally implies that it will not share personal information except in
45
limited situations, including when requested by law enforcement. It
is important to note that this provision only refers to personal
information, and does .not specifically address documents stored on
the cloud. Google also reserves the right to examine the content of
anything the website hosts. 46 Amazon is notorious for granting the
least amount of privacy protection on its cloud. 47 Amazon warns
users that when they utilize Amazon's cloud service provider, the user
grants Amazon unlimited access to the files. 48 However, Amazon's
49
justifications include compliance with any applicable laws.
Some
cloud providers take extra measures to protect user's data, which
50
includes encryption of said data while it is in storage.
To the
ultimate extreme, one provider takes a "zero knowledge" approach to
their cloud storage offering. 51 SpiderOak encrypts all data, does not

C.

Can a Cloud Service Provider Access or Share Your Files?

. When a cloud service provider accesses users' files, it is typically
m order to comply with a court order or law enforcement. 40 However
it is important to note that nearly half of cloud network users woultl
be "very" concerned if the cloud network provider immediately gave
law enforcement their files when law enforcement asked the provider
to do so. 41 Although the study was conducted several years ago it
showed that even when the cloud network use was not as preval~nt
users expected that the files and media they save on the cloud woultl
remain private. 42 Indeed, cloud users do not expect that a cloud
network provider will hand their data to law enforcement without a
second thought.
Cloud service providers explain when a user's stored files and
media will be accessed in privacy policies and terms of service. For
example, Dropbox's Terms of Service states that the provider will not
share users' files with anyone, including law enforcement except for
" rare except•10ns " or when the user provides permission. 43 ' Dropbox's
36.

See Eric A. Taub, Storing Your Files Inside the Cloud, N.Y. TIMES,
March 3, 2011, at B7 ("Backing up to an external hard drive doesn't
help whe~ your house burns or a tornado tears off the roof. If your
~omputer is destroyed, your hard drive, stored 10 feet away in a closet
is probably gone too.").
'

37.

S_ee Ngo, supra note 3 (describing the units of data storage, such as
gigabyte and terabyte, and how they relate to one another).

38.

See _Chen, supra note 24 (see chart for different types of cloud
providers).

39.

Id. (such as Windows Live and Dropbox).

40.

See, ~.g., D:~lOPBOX: PRIVACY POLICY, https://www.dropbox.com/
secunty#pnvacy (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) (indicating when and how
they comply with law enforcement).

41.

Horrigan, supra note 10 (regarding attitudes about possible data policies
of cloud services).

42.

Id.

43.

DROPBOX: TERMS OF SERVICE https://www.dropbox.com/terms (last
visited Mar. 26, 2012).
'
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44.

DROPBOX: SEC. TERMS, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited
Mar. 26, 2012).

45.

GOOGLE PRIVACY CENTER, http://www.google.com/intl/en/
privacy/privacy-policy.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) ("[W]e have a
good faith belief that access, use, preservation or disclosure of such
information is reasonably necessary to (a) satisfy any applicable law,
regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental request.").

46.

GOOGLE TERMS OF SERVICE, https://www.google.com/intl/
en/policies/terms/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012)
("We may review content to determine whether it is ille?al or
violates our policies, and we may remove or refuse to display
content that we reasonably believe violates our policies or the
law. But that does not necessarily mean that we review content,
so please don't assume that we do.").

47.

See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, No Privacy on Amazon's Cloud Drive,
ZDNET (Mar. 29, 2011, 9:02 AM) http://www.zdnet.com/
blog/ networking/ no-privacy-on-amazons-cloud-drive/ 882?tag=nl.e539
("Amazon can do pretty much anything they want with your files").

48.

AMAZON TERMS OF USE, Section 5.2: Our Right to Access Your Files,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_2005
57340_tou?nodeld=200557360 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).

49.
50.

Id.
CRASHPLAN, Sec. Details, http://www.crashplan.com/consumer/
security.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) (detailing data security and
protection) .

51.

SPIDEROAK, Is SpiderOak really "zero knowledge"'? Could you read a
user's data if forced at gunpoint'?, https://spideroak.com/faq/
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computer and local back-ups, a copy of his personal files would still be
safe, stored on a remote server miles away.36
Moreover, users may have access to nearly unlimited space on the
clou~. Users can sign up for the basic free package from the cloud
provider, which allows them to store anywhere from one to five
gigabytes37 of material. 38 Alternatively, consumers with greater needs
may choose to purchase as much as sixteen terabytes of storage from
a cloud provider. 39 This means that a user could store all of his files
and media on the cloud.

Security Terms state that the only information it will view about
users' files is the file's metadata, which includes the file's name or
location. 44 Google's privacy policy is much more complicated, but
generally implies that it will not share personal information except in
45
limited situations, including when requested by law enforcement. It
is important to note that this provision only refers to personal
information, and does . not specifically address documents stored on
the cloud. Google also reserves the right to examine the content of
anything the website hosts. 46 Amazon is notorious for granting the
least amount of privacy protection on its cloud. 47 Amazon warns
users that when they utilize Amazon's cloud service provider, the user
grants Amazon unlimited access to the files. 48 However, Amazon's
49
Some
justifications include compliance with any applicable laws.
cloud. providers take extra measures to protect user's data, which
50
To the
includes encryption of said data while it is in storage.
ultimate extreme, one provider takes a "zero knowledge" approach to
their cloud storage offering. 51 SpiderOak encrypts all data, does not

C.

Can a Cloud Service Provider Access or Share Your Files?

. When a cloud service provider accesses users' files, it is typically
m order to comply with a court order or law enforcement. 40 However
it is important to note that nearly half of cloud network users would
b e "very " concerned I'f t h e cloud network provider immediately gave
law enforcement their files when law enforcement asked the provider
to do so. 41 Although the study was conducted several years ago it
showed that even when the cloud network use was not as preval~nt
users expected that the files and media they save on the cloud would
remain private. 42 Indeed, cloud users do not expect that a cloud
network provider will hand their data to law enforcement without a
second thought.
Cloud service providers explain when a user's stored files and
media will be accessed in privacy policies and terms of service. For
example, Dropbox's Terms of Service states that the provider will not
share users' files with anyone, including law enforcement except for
" rare except•10ns " or wh en the user provides permission. 43 ' Dropbox's
36.

See Eric A. Taub, Storing Your Files Inside the Cloud, N.Y. TIMES,
March 3, 2011, at B7 ("Backing up to an external hard drive doesn't
help whe~ your house burns or a tornado tears off the roof. If your
~omputer is destroyed, your hard drive, stored 10 feet away in a closet,
is probably gone too.").

37.

S_ee Ngo, supra note 3 (describing the units of data storage, such as
gigabyte and terabyte, and how they relate to one another).

38.

See Chen, supra note 24 (see chart for different types of cloud
providers).

39.

Id. (such as Windows Live and Drop box).

40.

See, ~.g., DI_WPBOX: Pru:r~cy POLICY, https://www.dropbox.com/
secunty#pnvacy (last v1s1ted Mar. 26, 2012) (indicating when and how
they comply with law enforcement).

41.

Horrigan, supra note 10 (regarding attitudes about possible data policies
of cloud services).

42.

Id.

43.

DROPBOX: TERMS OF SERVICE https://www.dropbox.com/terms (last
visited Mar. 26, 2012).
'
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44.

DROPBOX: SEC. TERMS, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited
Mar. 26, 2012).

45.

GOOGLE PRIVACY CENTER, http://www.google.com/intl/en/
privacy /privacy-policy.html (last visited Mar._ 26, 201~) ("[W]e have a
good faith belief that access, use, preservat10~ or d1sclosu:e of such
information is reasonably necessary to (a) satisfy any applicable law,
regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental request.").

46.

GOOGLE TERMS OF SERVICE, https://www.google.com/intl/
en/policies/terms/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012)
("We may review content to determine whether it is ille~al or
violates our policies, and we may remove or refuse to display
content that we reasonably believe violates our policies or the
law. But that does not necessarily mean that we review content,
so please don't assume that we do.").

47.

See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, No Privacy on Amazon's Cloud Drive,
ZDNET (Mar. 29, 2011, 9:02 AM) http://www.zd~et.com/
blog/ networking/ no-privacy-on-amazons-cloud-drive/ ~82 ?tag=~L ~~39
("Amazon can do pretty much anything they want with your files ).

48.

AMAZON TERMS OF USE, Section 5.2: Our Right to Access Your Files,
http:/ /www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_2005
57340_tou?nodeld=200557360 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).

49.
50.

Id.
CRASHPLAN, Sec. Details, http://www.crashplan.com/consumer/
security.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) (detailing data security and
protection).

51.

SPIDEROAK, Is SpiderOak really "zero knowledge"? Could you read a
user's data if forced at gunpoint?, https://spideroak.com/faq/
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save user's passwords, and does not know the names of stored files or
folders; the company advertises that "[y]our SpiderOak data is
readable to you alone. "52
The commonality existing among these examples is that service
providers retain the means to comply with law enforcement requests.
The implications this has on the cloud's Fourth Amendment
protections are discussed below.

warrant, he may consider placing additional restrictions. Allowing
the magistrate to impose these restrictions in order to enforce the
warrant's particularity requirements ultimately helps prevent law
enforcement agents from overreaching and protects privacy.

III.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND COMPUTERS

One of the central concepts of American privacy law is the
freedom from governmental intrusion. 53 The Founders drafted. this
freedom directly into the Constitution as part of the Fourth
Amendment, which prevents the government from conducting
unreasonable searches or seizures and sets forth the warrant
requirements. 54 The Fourth Amendment's protections encompass
modern technology even though this technology did not exist at the
time of the Amendment's ratification, for the Fourth Amendment
protects against all unreasonable searches and seizures.
A.

Issuing Warrants

The Fourth Amendment requires that a valid warrant only issue
on "probable cause, supported by an oath or affirmation that
particularly describes the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. "55 These requirements prevent the issuance of
generalized warrants, and protect the privacy of those whose homes,
selves, and effects the police are searching. 56
This Note focuses on probable cause and the particularity
requirement. When the magistrate is reviewing the proposed search
questions/23/is_spideroak_really_zero_knowledge_could_you_read_a
_users_data_if_forced_at_gunpoint/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2012)
(giving an overview of its "zero knowledge" privacy policy).

1.

The Expectation of Privacy

The Fourth Amendment protects all people from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 57 Unless the search falls into one of numerous
exceptions, the Fourth Amendment requires that the police obtain a
warrant, based on probable cause, before conducting a search. 58 The
issue of whether a governmental intrusion constitutes a search has
been, and continues to be, a hotly contested issue.
In 1967, the Supreme Court held in Katz, that the Fourth
Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
"protectO people, not places. "59 Justice Harlan set forth a two-part
test in his concurrence, for whether the "area" is protected by the
Fourth Amendment: first, the individual must have expressed an
expectation of privacy in the place to be searched; and second, this
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as
This test has been adopted as the predominant
reasonable. 60
approach to evaluating the Fourth Amendment's protections. "What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected. "61 If an officer invades this
reasonable expectation of privacy absent a search warrant, he has
conducted an illegal search. 62
Since Katz, the Supreme Court has slowly enunciated where a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court refused to
expand the Fourth Amendment's protections to areas such as open
fields, due in part to the fact that "open fields are accessible to the
public." 63 However, in Kyllo v. United States, the Court expressed
that there is always a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's

52.

SPIDEROAK, Nuts f:f Bolts: True Privacy, https://spideroak.com/
engineering_matters (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). (showing the difference
between SpiderOak and other cloud storage providers).

57.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

53.

See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE 4 (Yale University Press)
(2011) [hereinafter SOLOVE].

58.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(l).

54.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated.").

59.

389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

60.

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

61.

Id. at 351-52.

55.

Id.

62.

56.

See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (noting that
the police must take care when sorting through papers, whose
evidentiary value is not immediately ascertainable, to "minimizeO
unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.").

Id. at 359 ("Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will
remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.").

63.

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) ("Open fields do not
provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance.").
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save user's passwords, and does not know the names of stored files or
folders; the company advertises that "[y]our SpiderOak data is
readable to you alone. "52
The commonality existing among these examples is that service
providers retain the means to comply with law enforcement requests.
The implications this has on the cloud's Fourth Amendment
protections are discussed below.

warrant, he may consider placing additional restrictions. Allowing
the magistrate to impose these restrictions in order to enforce the
warrant's particularity requirements ultimately helps prevent law
enforcement agents from overreaching and protects privacy.

III.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND COMPUTERS

One of the central concepts of American privacy law is the
freedom from governmental intrusion. 53 The Founders drafted this
freedom directly into the Constitution as part of the Fourth
Amendment, which prevents the government from conducting
unreasonable searches or seizures and sets forth the warrant
requirements. 54 The Fourth Amendment's protections encompass
modern technology even though this technology did not exist at the
time of the Amendment's ratification, for the Fourth Amendment
protects against all unreasonable searches and seizures.
A.

Issuing Warrants

The Fourth Amendment requires that a valid warrant only issue
on "probable cause, supported by an oath or affirmation that
particularly describes the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. "55 These requirements prevent the issuance of
generalized warrants, and protect the privacy of those whose homes,
selves, and effects the police are searching. 56
This Note focuses on probable cause and the particularity
requirement. When the magistrate is reviewing the proposed search
questions/23/is_spideroak_really_zero_knowledge_could_you_read_a
_users_data_if_forced_at_gunpoint/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2012)
(giving an overview of its "zero knowledge" privacy policy).

1.

The Expectation of Privacy

The Fourth Amendment protects all people from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 57 Unless the search falls into one of numerous
exceptions, the Fourth Amendment requires that the police obtain a
warrant, based on probable cause, before conducting a search. 58 The
issue of whether a governmental intrusion constitutes a search has
been, and continues to be, a hotly contested issue.
In 1967, the Supreme Court held in Katz, that the Fourth
Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
"protectO people, not places. "59 Justice Harlan set forth a two-part
test in his concurrence, for whether the "area" is protected by the
Fourth Amendment: first, the individual must have expressed an
expectation of privacy in the place to be searched; and second, this
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as
This test has been adopted as the predominant
reasonable. 60
approach to evaluating the Fourth Amendment's protections. "What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected. "61 If an officer invades this
reasonable expectation of privacy absent a search warrant, he has
conducted an illegal search. 62
Since Katz, the Supreme Court has slowly enunciated where a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court refused to
expand the Fourth Amendment's protections to areas such as open
fields, due in part to the fact that "open fields are accessible to the
public. "63 However, in Kyllo v. United States, the Court expressed
that there is always a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's

52.

SPIDEROAK, Nuts €1 Bolts: True Privacy, https://spideroak.com/
engineering_matters (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). (showing the difference
between SpiderOak and other cloud storage providers).

57.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

53.

See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE 4 (Yale University Press)
(2011) [hereinafter SoLOVE].

58.

FED.

54.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated.").

59.

389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

60.

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

61.

Id. at 351-52.

55.

Id.

62.

56.

See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (noting that
the police must take care when sorting through papers, whose
evidentiary value is not immediately ascertainable, to "minimizeO
unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.").

Id. at 359 ("Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will
remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.").

63.

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) ("Open fields do not
provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance.").
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home. 64 This reasonable expectation of privacy extends to the
personal items contained within one's home, which, by default,
include any computers that the resident may· own. 65 However, once
inside the home with a valid warrant, police may search for the items
listed on the warrant in places where these items are reasonably
expected to be. 66
The following are examples of areas where the expectation of
privacy has. been evaluated to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement applies. These examples hold
commonalities with the cloud network, and application of these
principles gives insight into why the Fourth Amendment protects the
cloud.

prior to it reaching its destination. 68 Officers must honor the warrant
requirement even when the piece of mail is suspicious and likely
contains something illegal. 69 An officer may detain the mail for the
period of time that it takes him to obtain a warrant, but may not
open and search the mail until a warrant has been obtained. 70

i.

Mail

Americans enjoy an expectation of privacy in the mail; the
government will not search their mail once the sender has relinquished
it to a branch of the federal government, the USPS, for delivery.
This expectation of privacy is historically well-established. In 1878,
the Supreme Court in Ex Parle Jackson stated that, "[l]etters and
sealed packages ... in the mail are as fully guarded from examination
and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they
were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own
domiciles." 67 The Court established that obtaining a warrant, "as is
required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household,"
is the only way an officer may open mail and examine its contents

64.

533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) ("[I]n the case of the search of the interior of
homes - the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of
protected privacy - there is. a ready criterion, with roots deep in the
GOmmon law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that
is acknowledged to be reasonable.").

65.

See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (discussing how
the Fourth Amendment draws a strict line when law enforcement enters
a private home).

66.

See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (i982) ("A lawful search
of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object
of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that
separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the
search. Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for
illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers,
and containers in which the weapon might be found."); see also YALE
KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 317 (12th ed. 2008)
("[The police] may only look where the items described in the warrant
might be concealE'.d. For example, if a search warrant indicated that the
items sought were stolen television sets, the officer would not be
authorized to rummage through desk drawers.").
96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).

67.

180

ii.

Trash

It has long been held that there is no expectation of privacy in
garbage that has been relinquished on the side of the road. 71 In
California v. Greenwood, the respondent challenged the admissibility
of evidence that the police obtained by asking the garbage collector to
keep his garbage separate, and then seizing it to conduct a search. 72
The Supreme Court found that the police's actions did not violate the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures and noted that:
[R]espondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express
purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who
might himself have sorted through respondents' trash or
permitted others, such as the police, to do so. Accordingly,
having deposited their garbage "in an area particularly suited
for public inspection and, in ·a manner of speaking, public
consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take
it[.]73

68.

Id. ("No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected
with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and
such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to mail
matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great principle
embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.").

69.

See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970) ("[N]o law
of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with the postal
service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters . . . and all
regulations adopted as to mail matter must be in subordination to the
great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the
Constitution.").

70.

Id. at 253 ("The significant Fourth Amendment interest was in the
privacy of this first-class mail; and that privacy was not disturbed or
invaded until the approval of the magistrate was obtained.").

71.

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988) ("Our conclusion
that society would not accept as reasonable respondents' claim to an
expectation of privacy in trash left for collection in an area accessible to
the public is reinforced by the unanimous rejection of similar claims by
the Federal Courts of Appeals.").

72.

Id. at 38.

73.

Id. at 40-41(citation omitted).
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home. 64 This reasonable expectation of privacy extends to the
personal items contained within one's home, which, by default,
include any computers that the resident may· own. 65 However, once
inside the home with a valid warrant, police may search for the items
listed on the warrant in places where these items are reasonably
expected to be. 66
The following are examples of areas where the expectation of
privacy has_ been evaluated to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement applies. These examples hold
commonalities with the cloud network, and application of these
principles gives insight into why the Fourth Amendment protects the
cloud.
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64.
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65.
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66.
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of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that
separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the
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96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).

67.
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Thus, when an object is knowingly relinquished to a third party,
the expectation of privacy may be negated. However, the Supreme
Court's holding in Greenwood was in part based on the contention
that "[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. "74

location he is to search with "reasonable effort. "81 The "things to be
seized" prong requires the description be sufficient enough so that an
officer will be able to determine which items he may seize and which
he may not. 82 This prong also requires that any item seized be within
the scope of the probable cause. 83
However, often one or both of these prongs are lacking. The
Supreme Court recently outlined the warrant particularity
requirements in Groh v. Ramirez, holding that a warrant that
described with particularity the place to be searched was invalid
because the warrant failed to identify any of the items that the
petitioner intended to seize. 84 In Groh, the warrant's description of
items to be seized was limited to one item: "[a] single dwelling
residence ... blue in color. "85 The Court held that the warrant did
not contain a description of the items to be seized "at all," and
although there was probable cause to issue the search: warrant, the
Court invalidated it due to the lack of particularity. 86
Thus, because it is possible to establish probable cause to search a
location for one item, but not another, 87 or that the warrant that may
be so facially overbroad that it allows an agent to seize an entire
house, 88 agents must exercise diligence when describing the place to be
searched or the things to be seized. Law enforcement agents must
also take care to not to be overly broad, because courts also refuse to

2.

Probable Cause

The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause. "75 Probable cause essentially means that
there is a "fair probability" that the specific evidence sought will be
at the place to be searched at the time that law enforcement wishes to
search it. 76 Probable cause has been defined as a "fluid" concept, and
is evaluated through a totality of the circumstances test, based on a
practical, common-sense determination. 77 However, probable cause is
not established if there is only minimal support that the evidence may
be in that location. 78 Once the magistrate determined that probable
cause exists, he may issue the warrant as long as the other warrant
requirements are met. 79
3.

Particularity Requirement

To fulfill the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, a
warrant must "particularly" describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. 80 The place to be searched prong
requires that the officer conducting the search be able to identify the

74.

Id. at 40 (emphasis added).

75.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (regarding searches and seizures).

76.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("The task of the issuing
magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.").

77.

Id. at 232 (probable cause turns on "the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules.").

81.

Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925) (here, the description
of the building as a garage and for business purposes at 611 W. 45th
Street was a sufficient description).

82.

Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 296 (1927) (noting that nothing
can be left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant as to
what is to be taken).

83.

Cf., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (noting that an officer
executing a search warrant must ensure that the search is "lawfully
authorized and lawfully conducted," and because there was no
description of things to be seized, the "search was clearly 'unreasonable'
under the Fourth Amendment.").

84.

Id. at 554-555 (emphasis added).

85.

Id. at 558.
Id. at 557("The warrant was plainly invalid . . . 'the warrant . . . was
deficient in particularity because it provided no description of the type
of evidence sought."') (citation omitted).

78.

Id. at 239 ("Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate
to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.").

86.

79.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Gates, 462 U.S. at 239-240 (explaining that
the totality of the circumstances test will not lessen the magistrate's
ability to make a determination as to whether probable cause exists to
issue a warrant).

87.

Cf., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (1999) (finding that
the scope of the warrant had been exceeded because there was probable
cause to search the computer for evidence of drug dealing, not the child
pornography that the detective found).

80.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

88.

Groh, 540 U.S. at 554.
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Court's holding in Greenwood was in part based on the contention
that "[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. "74
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officer will be able to determine which items he may seize and which
he may not. 82 This prong also requires that any item seized be within
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items to be seized was limited to one item: "[a] single dwelling
residence . . . blue in color. "85 The Court held that the warrant did
not contain a description of the items to be seized "at all," and
although there was probable cause to issue the search warrant, the
Court invalidated it due to the lack of particularity. 86
Thus, because it is possible to establish probable cause to search a
location for one item, but not another, 87 or that the warrant that may
be so facially overbroad that it allows an agent to seize an entire
house, 88 agents must exercise diligence when describing the place to be
searched or the things to be seized. Law enforcement agents must
also take care to not to be overly broad, because courts also refuse to

2.

Probable Cause

The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause. "75 Probable cause essentially means that
there is a "fair probability" that the specific evidence sought will be
at the place to be searched at the time that law enforcement wishes to
search it. 76 Probable cause has been defined as a "fluid" concept, and
is evaluated through a totality of the circumstances test, based on a
practical, common-sense determination. 77 However, probable cause is
not established if there is only minimal support that the evidence may
be in that location. 78 Once the magistrate determined that probable
cause exists, he may issue the warrant as long as the other warrant
requirements are met. 79
3.

Particularity Requirement

To fulfill the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, a
warrant must "particularly" describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. 80 The place to be searched prong
requires that the officer conducting the search be able to identify the

74.

Id. at 40 (emphasis added).

75.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (regarding searches and seizures).

76.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("The task of the issuing
magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.").

77.

Id. at 232 (probable cause turns on "the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules.").

81.

Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925) (here, the description
of the building as a garage and for business purposes at 611 W. 45th
Street was a sufficient description).

82.

Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 296 (1927) (noting that nothing
can be left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant as to
what is to be taken).

83.

Cf., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (noting that an officer
executing a search warrant must ensure that the search is "lawfully
authorized and lawfully conducted," and because there was no
description of things to be seized, the "search was clearly 'unreasonable'
under the Fourth Amendment.").

84.

Id. at 554-555 (emphasis added).

85.

Id. at 558.
Id. at 557("The warrant was plainly invalid . . . 'the warrant . . . was
deficient in particularity because it provided no description of the type
of evidence sought."') (citation omitted).

78.

Id. at 239 ("Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate
to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.").

86.

79.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Gates, 462 U.S. at 239-240 (explaining that
the totality of the circumstances test will not lessen the magistrate's
ability to make a determination as to whether probable cause exists to
issue a warrant).

87.

Cf., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (1999) (finding that
the scope of the warrant had been exceeded because there was probable
cause to search the computer for evidence of drug dealing, not the child
pornography that the detective found).

80.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

88.

Groh, 540 U.S. at 554.
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uphold "blanket warrants," which are warrants that allow for broad
scale search and seizures, absent proof of necessity. 89
One of the main issues with computer warrants is that they often
suffer from lack of particularity. Thus, police should diligently
describe with particularity the specific files they seek in the warrant
application, 90 and not simply provide a generalized description of the
physical computer itself. It is also imperative that the police strictly
abide by the particularity requirement, instead of merely requesting
to search every file on the computer because of the large quantity of
information that computers are capable of holding. 91 To make the
description as particular as possible, it should include the type of file
92
or media , where the files may be located, and/ or a description of the
crime itself and how the files or media sought may be related. 93
4.

Restrictions Imposed by Magistrates

Magistrates have begun to impose restrictions on the scope of
computer warrants in an attempt to discourage law enforcement
agents from exceeding the scope of what they have probable cause to
search or seize. 94 These warrant limitations include the how and when
the agent may conduct a computer search or seizure, among other
95
As it relates to computer searches, this means that a
things.
89.

See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2006) ("We
do not approve of issuing warrants authorizing blanket removal of all
computer storage media for later examination when there is no affidavit
giving a reasonable explanation . . . as to why a wholesale seizure is
necessary.").

90.

See e.g., Carey, at 1275 (noting that "the magistrate should then
require officers to specify in a warrant which types of files are sought.").

91.

See e.g., United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2008)
("Computers, like briefcases and cassette tapes, can be repositories for
documents and records.").

92.

For example, a computer file may be a picture or drawing in .JPG
format, or a Microsoft Word document (.doc).

93.

See e.g., United States v. Gawrysiak, 972 F.Supp. 853, 860-61 (D. N.J.
1997) aff'd 178 F.3d 1281 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding the validity of a
search warrant because it specifically limited what agents could search
for, leaving little to their discretion).

94.

95.

See Orin Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96
VA. L. REV. 1241 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter Ex Ante Regulation]
(describing why magistrates should not impose restrictions on warrants);
see contra Paul Ohm, Response, Massive Hard Drives, General
Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. IN
BRJEF 1 (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter Ohm] (responding to Kerr's article and
describing why magistrates should be able to impose restriction).
See Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 94, at 1243-44 (describing four
categories of how federal magistrate judges have limited computer
searches and seizures).
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magistrate may require that police only search for files or documents
that have a .JPG or a .DOC extension, instead of allowing police to
search any and all documents or folders on the system. 96
Some scholars have criticized this approach, 97 yet others approve
The
of the magistrates taking additional privacy safeguards. 98
argument against magistrate-imposed restrictions is based on the
contention that the subsequent adversarial proceedings will play the
same role; thus, the restrictions are unnecessary. 99 The argument
continues that if law enforcement has established probable cause, then
the magistrate should not be allowed to limit the search because he is
not in the position to know enough about the case to establish
workable restrictions. 100
On the other hand, those who argue in favor of allowing
magistrates to place restrictions on warrants believe that these rules
are "designed to cure the manifest lack of probable cause and
particularity in almost every computer case. "10l It is important to
note that magistrates rarely impose these types of restrictions outside
of computer cases, and they must consider these types of searches in a
different context; "computer search warrants are the closest things to
general warrants we have confronted in the . history of the
Republic. " 102 Allowing magistrates to place restrictions on computer
search warrants provides two very important protections: first, it
allows magistrates to limit searches to areas where probable cause
exists and to protect against a lack of particularity; and second, it
recogniZes that the particularity requirement must be read differently
in regards to computer searches to avoid general warrants. 103

96.

See id. at 1255-58 (giving examples of how magistrates have limited
computer searches in the past).

97.

See id. at 1247 (arguing that "ex parte" regulations are "unworkable
and counterproductive" and that the same results can be achieved
through legal challenges to the search).

98.

See Ohm, supra note 94, at 12 (disagreeing with Kerr's argument
against ex ante regulations, and noting that "[i]f the Fourth Amendment
imposes new restrictions on what law enforcement agents can do, those
agents will, as they have so many times before, find a way to conti~ue
to do their jobs efficiently and successfully while at the same time
respecting the rights of the people.").

99.

See Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 94, at 1293.

100. See id. at 1282 ("a magistrate judge cannot get a sense of the exigencies
that will unfold at each stage of the search process.").
101. See Ohm, supra note 94, at 4.
102. See id. at 11.
103. See id. at 10.
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B.

Warrant Exceptions

The third party doctrine and consent searches deal with the same
concept: a user forgoes his expectation of privacy when he purposely
places something in the hands of another. These are arguably very
persuasive reasons why the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
However,
is already negated in regards to the cloud network.
distinctive differences exist in the way that the cloud works that
renders these doctrines inapplicable and shows the Fourth
Amendment's protections still apply to the cloud because a user
maintains his expectation of privacy.
1.

Third Party Doctrine

The basis of the third party doctrine is found in the 1966
Supreme Court decision Hoffa v. United States. 104 The Court held
that:
What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies
upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally
protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his
automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental
intrusion. And when he puts something in his filing cabinet, in his
desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be
secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. 105
However, Hoffa involved the admissibility of incriminating
statements that the defendant, Hoffa, made to the third-party
government agent who was in the hotel room. 106 The Court based its
finding that Hoffa did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his incriminating statements because Hoffa voluntarily disclosed the
information to the third party, who he had trusted. 107
It was obvious that the petitioner was not relying on the security
of his hotel suite when he made the incriminating statements to [the
third party] or in [his] presence. [The third party] did not enter the
suite by force or by stealth. He was not a surreptitious eavesdropper.
[The third party] was in the suite by invitation, and every
conversation which he heard was either directed to him or knowingly
carried out in his presence. 108
. This reasoning became the basis of the third party doctrine,
which holds that when an individual voluntarily places information in
104. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
105. Id. at 301.
106. Id. at 302.
107. Id. ("the petitioner, in a word, was not relying on the security of the
hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that [the third
party] would not reveal his wrongdoing.").
108. Id.
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the hands of a third party, he loses his expectation of privacy in the
. £ormat·10n. 109 A n actor assumes the risk that a third party, such as
m
the person at the receiving end of the communication, will report the
contents of the communication to the police.11° At this point, the
conversation no longer holds Fourth Amendment protections because
the actor has foregone his reasonable expectation of privacy. 111
The third party doctrine is problematic for the technological
world. 112 Use of the cloud network potentially invokes this doctrine
since users voluntarily place their files in the hands of a third-party
service provider. 113 Therefore, the argument can be made that when a
person voluntarily turns files over to a third-party cloud provider by
utilizing their services, the government may obtain the files or media
held by the third party without a warrant.11 4 However, this argument
is contingent upon the assumption that there is no expectation of
privacy in the cloud, and that a cloud network provider is the type of
third party that the Hoffa Court envisioned.
2.

Consent Searches

When the police do not have a valid warrant, and may not be
able to easily obtain one, they sometimes attempt to engage in a
consent search. 115 Law enforcement engages in a consent search when
they gain voluntary permission from either the person who has

109. Id. at 303 (holding that no Fourth Amendment rights were violated in
the case).
110. Id. ("The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an
informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is
probably inherent in the conditions of human society.").
111. Id.
112. SOLOVE, supra note 53, at 102-110 (describing how the third party
doctrine has developed in regards to technology).
113. SOLOVE, supra note 53, at 105-106 (describing how the cloud potentially
invokes the third party doctrine, which removes the Fourth
Amendment's protections from the cloud).
114. See David A. Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying the Fourth
Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud
Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2213-16 (June 2009) (explaining how
the third party doctrine can be applied to cloud computing); see also
SOLOVE, supra note 53, at 106 ("Since people's documents are no longer
stored on their home computerl'; but reside instead with third parties,
the shift to cloud computing will effectively remove Fourth Amendment
protection from their documents.").
115. See e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) ("In
situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but
lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid
consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable
evidence.").

187

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL.

4 ·No. l · 2012

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET · VOL.

Searching the Clouds
B.

Warrant Exceptions
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is contingent upon the assumption that there is no expectation of
privacy in the cloud, and that a cloud network provider is the type of
third party that the Hoffa Court envisioned.
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the third party doctrine can be applied to cloud computing); see also
SOLOVE, supra note 53, at 106 ("Since people's documents are no longer
stored on their home computerE; but reside instead with third parties,
the shift to cloud computing will effectively remove Fourth Amendment
protection from their documents.").
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116

authority, or one who has "joint occupancy," 117 in order to conduct
the search.
This determination is based on the surrounding
circumstances.118 Once consent is granted, the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement is considered waived. 119
As mentioned briefly above, third parties may grant consent when
they have "joint access or authority" in a particular area that the
police wish to search. 120 In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court
held that consent to search was valid when given by somebody who
the police reasonably believed had the authority to grant the
121
consent.
For example, the police relied on the fact that the woman
who gave consent to search an apartment had keys to the area, stored
clothing and furniture there, and called it "our" apartment. 122
However, it is important to remember that when someone giving
consent clearly does not have the authority to do so, consent is
invalidated because the police should not have reasonably relied on
the consent. 123
C.

Physical Computer Searches - Counteracting Overly Broad
Warrants

Typically, so long as the warrant complies with Fourth
Amendment requirements, no issues arise when the police obtain a
warrant and conduct a search of a computer's physical hard drive. 124

116. Id. at 248-49.
117. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169 (1974) ("It has been
assumed by the parties and the courts below that the voluntary consent
of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises jointly
occupied is valid against the co-occupant[.]").
118. Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 248-49 ("Voluntariness is a question of fact to
be determined from all the circumstances[.]").
119. Id. at 221 (noting that the appellate court found that a consent search
was "a waiver of a constitutional right," thus a showing of voluntariness
needed to be established).
120. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169.

Challenges arise when a defendant later alleges that the police
exceeded the scope of the warrant. 125 For example, police may
purposely search for evidence outside the warrant's scope, 126 or when
they purposely seize more files or data than they actually need. 127
However, it is clear that when the warrant is limited to the
computer's physical hard drive, the search ends there; law
enforcement may not use an otherwise valid warrant to access the
user's cloud account.
Currently, police conduct searches of the files and documents
contained on a computer in one of two ways. First, pursuant to the
warrant, the police enter the location and seize the computer. 128 The
police retain control of the computer while searching the hard drive in
a controlled environment, a process that may take anywhere from
days to months. 129 Alternatively, an agent makes an exact, read-only
image of the hard drive as it is at the moment of the search. 130 The
sought, and that a warrant that fails to comply with these requirements
is invalid).
125. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer
Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193,
197-216 (2005) [hereinafter Clancy] (explaining the various search
methodologies and the issues with each of them).
126. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270, 1273-74 (10th Cir.
1999) (explaining that a warrant to search the defendant's computer for
"names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other
documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of
controlled substances," constrained the search to only those items listed
and noting that the officer in question knew that he was exceeding the
scope of the warrant. Thus, the subsequently seized evidence was
inadmissible.).
127. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162,
1173 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane) (holding that when the government
purposefully exceeded the scope of the warrant and seized more
information than it was allowed, it needed to return the property it
obtained through its intentional wrongdoing).

122. Id. at 179.

128. See United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2006)
(specifying reasons to seize the computer in its entirety in lieu of
bringing a laptop to the scene to sort through the material, even though
that meant non-seizable material would be taken as well. These included
the risk that the police. may damage the storage medium or compromise
the evidence, and that the process of searching on-site might take a long
time.).

123. Id. at 186 (describing how the officer's reliance on the consent to search
must be reasonable).

129. See, e.g., id. at 975-75 (explaining why the seizure of a computer and
the subsequent search back at the police station was not unreasonable).

124. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (explaining that a
warrant needs to comply with the Fourth Amendment's four
proscriptions: probable cause, supported by sworn affidavit, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the type of evidence

130. See Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 531, 540 (2005) [hereinafter Searches and Seizures] ("To ensure the
evidentiary integrity of the original evidence, the computer forensics
process always begins with the creation of perfect 'bitstream' copy or
'image' of the original storage device saved as a 'read only' file. All

121. 497 U.S. 177, 188-189 (1990) ("[D]etermination of consent to enter must
'be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to
the officer at the moment . . . [warrant a beliefj' that the consenting
party had authority over the premises ... if so, then the search is valid.")
(citation omitted).
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authority, 116 or one who has "joint occupancy, "117 in order to conduct
the search.
This determination is based on the surrounding
circumstances.U8 Once consent is granted, the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement is considered waived. 119
As mentioned briefly above, third parties may grant consent when
they have "joint access or authority" in a particular area that the
police wish to search. 120 In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court
held that consent to search was valid when given by somebody who
the police reasonably believed had the authority to grant the
121
consent.
For example, the police relied on the fact that the woman
who gave consent to search an apartment had keys to the area, stored
clothing and furniture there, and called it "our" apartment. 122
However, it is important to remember that when someone giving
consent clearly does not have the authority to do so, consent is
invalidated because the police should not have reasonably relied on
the consent. 123
C.

Physical Computer Searches - Counteracting Overly Broad
Warrants

Typically, so long as the warrant complies with Fourth
Amendment requirements, no issues arise when the police obtain a
warrant and conduct a search of a computer's physical hard drive. 124

116. Id. at 248-49.
117. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169 (1974) ("It has been
assumed by the parties and the courts below that the voluntary consent
of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises jointly
occupied is valid against the co-occupant[.]").
118. Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 248-49 ("Voluntariness is a question of fact to
be determined from all the circumstances[.]").
119. Id. at 221 (noting that the appellate court found that a consent search
was "a waiver of a constitutional right," thus a showing of voluntariness
needed to be established).
120. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169.
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Challenges arise when a defendant later alleges that the police
exceeded the scope of the warrant. 125 For example, police may
purposely search for evidence outside the warrant's scope, 126 or when
they purposely seize more files or data than they actually need. 127
However, it is clear that when the warrant is limited to the
computer's physical hard drive, the search ends there; law
enforcement may not use an otherwise valid warrant to access the
user's cloud account.
Currently, police conduct searches of the files and documents
contained on a computer in one of two ways. First, pursuant to the
warrant, the police enter the location and seize the computer. 128 The
police retain control of the computer while searching the hard drive in
a controlled environment, a process that may take anywhere from
days to months. 129 Alternatively, an agent makes an exact, read-only
image of the hard drive as it is at the moment of the search. 130 The
sought, and that a warrant that fails to comply with these requirements
is invalid).
125. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer
Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193,
197-216 (2005) [hereinafter Clancy] (explaining the various search
methodologies and the issues with each of them).
126. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270, 1273-74 (10th Cir.
1999) (explaining that a warrant to search the defendant's computer for
"names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other
documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of
controlled substances," constrained the search to only those items listed
and noting that the officer in question knew that he was exceeding the
scope of the warrant. Thus, the subsequently seized evidence was
inadmissible.).
127. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162,
1173 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane) (holding that when the government
purposefully exceeded the scope of the warrant and seized more
information than it was allowed, it needed to return the property it
obtained through its intentional wrongdoing).

122. Id. at 179.

128. See United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2006)
(specifying reasons to seize the computer in its entirety in lieu of
bringing a laptop to the scene to sort through the material, even though
that meant non-seizable material would be taken as well. These included
the risk that the police. may damage the storage medium or compromise
the evidence, and that the process of searching on-site might take a long
time.).

123. Id. at 186 (describing how the officer's reliance on the consent to search
must be reasonable).

129. See, e.g., id. at 975-75 (explaining why the seizure of a computer and
the subsequent search back at the police station was not unreasonable).

121. 497 U.S. 177, 188-189 (1990) ("[D]etermination of consent to enter must
'be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to
the officer at the moment . . . [warrant a beliefj' that the consenting
party had authority over the premises ... if so, then the search is valid.")
(citation omitted).

124. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (explaining that a
warrant needs to comply with the Fourth Amendment's four
proscriptions: probable cause, supported by sworn affidavit, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the type of evidence
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130. See Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 531, 540 (2005) [hereinafter Searches and Seizures] ("To ensure the
evidentiary integrity of the original evidence, the computer forensics
process always begins with the creation of perfect 'bitstream' copy or
'image' of the original storagE'. device saved as a 'read only' file. All
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agent takes the copy, rather than the actual physical computer, back
to the lab where other officers search the read-only images at their
·
131 B
h
.
1e1sure.
ecause t e copy is read-only, the subsequent search will
132
not alter the copy.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows
for either approach. 133
Courts have demonstrated they are unwilling to apply the "one
warrant fits all" approach to electronic file seizure. In United States
v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, when government agents seized all
the drug testing records located at Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.
because it was "too hard" to distinguish the ten accounts they sought
from the hundreds that were intertwined on a single excel
spreadsheet, the Ninth Circuit required the evidence be returned.134
The Ninth Circuit, en bane, recognized that an officer must take extra
steps to protect the privacy of those who are subjected to an overly135
broad warrant, and noted "[t]he pressing need of law enforcement
for broad authorization to examine electronic records . . . creates a
serious risk that every warrant for electronic information will become
in effect, a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment
irrelevant. "136
These extra steps are required because the court specifically
acknowledged that situations exist where broad-scale seizure may be
the only feasible way to efficiently conduct the search. 137 The
enforcement of these additional requirements addresses instances
when it is especially apparent that it is "an obvious case of deliberate
overreaching by the government in an effort to seize data as to which
it lacked probable cause. "138
To counter the issue of overbroad searches and lack of clear
guidelines, the law has begun analogizing computer hard drive
analysis is performed on the bitstream copy instead of the original. The
actual search occurs on the government's computer, not the
defendant's.").
131. See id. at 540-41.
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searches to different physical search methodologies. The government
has recognized the need for limiting electronic searches, and has, in
fact, codified that comparable searches must be limited. 139 For
example, the procedure for interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications states "[e]very order and extension . . . shall be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this
chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized
objective. "140 It is important to gain a basic understanding of these
analogies in order to understand why none encompass the cloud,
which explains why law enforcement needs a separate warrant to
search the cloud network.
1.

The "Container" Search Analogy

Likely due to the ease of comparison, hard drive searches are most
commonly compared to "container" searches. 141 The container search
analogy is based on the Supreme Court's holding that an officer's
warrantless search of personal containers violates the owner's
reasonable expectation of privacy. 142 However, when the police have a
valid warrant, they are able to search any container that may contain
the item described in the warrant. 143 Because the courts have
analogized computers to be the "functional equivalent" of containers,
the police may search a · computer because items specified on the
warrant might be contained therein. 144
Scholars and courts alike have criticized applying the container
analogy to computer searches because it is overly broad and
essentially provides a "blank check" to the officer by giving him
access to every file on the computer. 145 It is argued that police should
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006) (describing how "[n]o order entered under
this section [of the law] may authorize or approve the interception ~f
any wire, oral, or electronic communication for any period longer than is
necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization").
140. § 2518(5).

132. Id. at 541.
133. F. R. CRJM. P. 41(f)(l)(B) ("[I]n a case involving the seizure of
~lectroni? storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored
mformat10n[.]") (emphasis added).
134. 621 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane).

141. Office of Legal Educ. & Exec. Office for United States Attorneys,
Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in
Criminal
Investigations,
2-3
(2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.p~

("To determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information stored in a computer, it helps to treat the
computer like a closed container such as a briefcase or file cabinet.");
see also Searches and Seizures, supra note 130 at 550.

135. Id. a~ 1177 (explaining that judicial officers must be vigilant in "striking
the nght balance between the government's interest in law enforcement
and the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures").

142. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982).

136. Id. at 1176.

143. See Clancy, supra note 125, at 198-99.

137. Id. at 1169.

144. Id. at 199 ("computers have been said to be [like containers]").

138. Id. at 1172.

145. Id. at 203-204; see also United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir.
1999).
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example, the procedure for interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications states "[e]very order and extension . . . shall be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this
chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized
objective. "140 It is important to gain a basic understanding of these
analogies in order to understand why none encompass the cloud,
which explains why law enforcement needs a separate warrant to
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The "Container" Search Analogy

Likely due to the ease of comparison, hard drive searches are most
commonly compared to "container" searches. 141 The container search
analogy is based on the Supreme Court's holding that an officer's
warrantless search of personal containers violates the owner's
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the item described in the warrant. 143 Because the courts have
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essentially provides a "blank check" to the officer by giving him
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be required to utilize restrictive measures in order to protect the
privacy of the user .146 The next two search methodologies are ways to
limit the container search analogy.
2.

The "Sub-Container" Search Analogy

Arguably, a warrant may constitute permission to search the
entire computer container without limitations; thus it may be
necessary to place further limitations on a computer container
147
Applying a "sub-container" analogy provides some added
search.
protections. Under this view, the computer is still viewed as one big
container or "physical shell, "148 but each directory or file is an even
smaller ·unit, a "sub-container. "149 This view dictates that each subfolder saved on the physical hard drive of the computer, e.g., a
document, spreadsheet, or file, requires an individual search warrant.

150

However, the sub-c.ontainer theory has been criticized as an
unworkable standard. 151 "Storage media do[es] not naturally divide
into parts. Subdivisions must be invented, and every subdivision
strategy comes with flaws. "152 This theory is difficult to apply. 153
Law enforcement has no consistent standard to determine what might
be considered a "sub-container. "154 Some courts may view each
individual file on a computer as a sub-container; however, other
courts may find that the individuals lines within an excel spreadsheet,
a single file, are sub-containers. 155 As "defining subcontainers defines

146. Clancy, supra note 125 at 203-204 (rejecting the container approach).
147. See Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment,
16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 112 [hereinafter Goldfoot] ("Computer
storage media can reveal facts relevant to an investigation, but they can
also reveal irrelevant facts that can be embarrassing or inform
investigators for the first time about a new crime.").
148. Id. at 118.
149. Id. at 112-13, 119.
150. Id. at 119-120.
151. Id. at 131-32 (discussing the issues applying the sub-container view to
computer searches).
152. Id. at 131.
153. Id. at 125-30 (describing a few of the many issues that the subcontainer
view brings with it).
154. Id. at 125 ("From the subcontainer perspective, this question becomes:
what are the subcontainers?").
155. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162,
1181 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane) (J., Kozinski, concurring) (implicitly
applying the subcontainer view when noting law enforcement could have
"could have selected the spreadsheet rows for the ten ballplayers for
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what information is immune from seizure," 156 the officers must be
careful to specifically particularize the warrant to their search and to
perhaps conduct a very narrow search to not miss a necessary subcontainer.
However, the ease of mobility of information on a
computer dictates that this might not be the easiest thing to do.
3.

The "Special" Approach Theory Analogy

As a third alternative, courts may utilize the "special" approach
theory of computer searches, which is similar to the sub-container
approach. For example, a magistrate utilizes the special approach in
limiting the warrant by seeking a description or an example of the
evidence sought by law enforcement before authorizing a broad
search, and allowing the search to encompass only specific search
terms that may relate to .the items sought. 157 When utilizing this
method, the court requires the warrant to "include measures to direct
the subsequent search of the computer. "158
Courts have considered the special approach. 159 For example, in
United State~ v. Carey, the police seized two computers and obtained
a search warrant to search for evidence related to drugs. 160 After
conducting the search, the detective stumbled upon evidence of child
pornography when he opened a file containing such pornography and
continued to purposefully open subsequent files that he knew were not
related to drugs. 161 .The court rejected the government's attempted
justification of the search through its proposed file cabinet
argument, 162 and found that the detective had purposely exceeded the
whom he had a warrant, then copied and pasted those rows into a blank
spreadsheet. If he had done so, he would have seen only those drug
testing results for which he had a warrant.").
156. Goldfoot, supra note 147, at 125.
157. See Clancy, supra note 125, · at 199-200 (criticizing the "special"
approach as unworkable in light of the reality of the ease in which one
may manipulate computer files); but see United States v. Carey, 172
F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999) (utilizing the "special" approach and
suppressing the evidence found when an officer opened .JPG files, which
were not included in the warrant).
158. See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 955 (N.D.
Ill. 2004) (expressing concern over the government's intention to review
all files contained on a computer to determine their evidentiary nature,
and requiring the government to provide a detailed protocol outlining
the way the search would be limited).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999)
(acknowledging that computers often contain intermingled documents).
160. Id. at 1270.
161. Id. at 1271.
162. Id. at 1272 (rejecting the government's argument that because they had
a warrant to search the computer, they could search the computer for

193

JouRNALOFLAw, TECHNOLOGY&THEINTERNET · VoL. 4 · No.1·2012.

Searching the Clouds

be required to utilize restrictive measures in order to protect the
privacy of the user .146 The next two search methodologies are ways to
limit the container search analogy.
2.

The "Sub-Container" Search Analogy

Arguably, a warrant may constitute permission: to search the
entire computer container without limitations; thus it may be
necessary to place further limitations on a computer container
147
Applying a "sub-container" analogy provides some added
search.
protections. Under this view, the computer is still viewed as one big
container or "physical shell, "148 but each directory or file is an even
smaller ·unit, a "sub-container. "149 This view dictates that each subfolder saved on the physical hard drive of the computer, e.g., a
document, spreadsheet, or file, requires an individual search warrant.

150

However, the sub-c.ontainer theory has been criticized as an
unworkable standard. 151 "Storage media do[es] not naturally divide
into parts. Subdivisions must be invented, and every subdivision
strategy comes with flaws. "152 This theory is difficult to apply. 153
Law enforcement has no consistent standard to determine what might
be considered a "sub-container." 154 Some courts may view each
individual file on a computer as a sub-container; however, other
courts may find that the individuals lines within an excel spreadsheet,
a single file, are sub-containers. 155 As "defining subcontainers defines

146. Clancy, supra note 125 at 203-204 (rejecting the container approach).
147. See Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment,
16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 112 [hereinafter Goldfoot] ("Computer
storage media can reveal facts relevant to an investigation, but they can
also reveal irrelevant facts that can be embarrassing or inform
investigators for the first time about a new crime.").
148. Id. at 118.
149. Id. at 112-13, 119.
150. Id. at 119-120.
151. Id. at 131-32 (discussing the issues applying the sub-container view to
computer searches).
152. Id. at 131.
153. Id. at 125-30 (describing a few of the many issues that the subcontainer
view brings with it).
154. Id. at 125 ("From the subcontainer perspective, this question becomes:
what are the subcontainers?").
155. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162,
1181 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane) (J., Kozinski, concurring) (implicitly
applying the subcontainer view when noting law enforcement could have
"could have selected the spreadsheet rows for the ten ballplayers for
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what information is immune from seizure, "156 the officers must be
careful to specifically particularize the warrant to their search and to
perhaps conduct a very narrow search to not miss a necessary subcontainer.
However, the ease of mobility of information on a
computer dictates that this might not be the easiest thing to do.
3.

The "Special" Approach Theory Analogy

As a third alternative, courts may utilize the "special" approach
theory of computer searches, which is similar to the sub-container
approach. For example, a magistrate utilizes the special approach in
limiting the warrant by seeking a description or an example of the
evidence sought by law enforcement before authorizing a broad
search, and allowing the search to encompass only specific search
terms that may relate to the items sought. 157 When utilizing this
method, the court requires the warrant to "include measures to direct
the subsequent search of the computer. "158
Courts have considered the special approach. 159 For example, in
United States v. Carey, the police seized two computers and obtained
a search warrant to search for evidence related to drugs. 160 After
conducting the search, the detective stumbled upon evidence of child
pornography when he opened a file containing such pornography and
continued to purposefully open subsequent files that he knew were not
related to drugs. 161 The court rejected the government's attempted
justification of the search through its proposed file cabinet
argument, 162 and found that the detective had purposely exceeded the
whom he had a warrant, then copied and pasted those rows into a blank
spreadsheet. If he had done so, he would have seen only those drug
testing results for which he had a warrant.").
156. Goldfoot, supra note 147, at 125.
157. See Clancy, supra note 125, · at 199-200 (criticizing the "special"
approach as unworkable in light of the reality of the ease in which one
may manipulate computer files); but see United States v. Carey, 172
F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999) (utilizing the "special" approach and
suppressing the evidence found when an officer opened .JPG files, which
were not included in the warrant).
158. See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 955 (N.D.
Ill. 2004) (expressing concern over the government's intention to review
all files contained on a computer to determine their evidentiary nature,
and requiring the government to provide a detailed protocol outlining
the way the search would be limited).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999)
(acknowledging that computers often contain intermingled documents).
160. Id. at 1270.
161. Id. at 1271.
162. Id. at 1272 (rejecting the government's argument that because they had
a warrant to search the computer, they could search the computer for
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.
warrant 's scope. 163 Th e court opmed
that the magistrate should
require the officers to state the type of files they sought in the
warrant, and that the search must be specifically limited to these
types of files. 164
The special approach, however, has also been criticized and
generally165 deemed useless and inappropriate to govern computer
searches. _ , This criticism r~sides in the ease that criminals may
change a files n~m~ or extension to unrelated or unsuspicious topics,
~n~ t_hat thos~ crnn.mals who utilize computers are often sophisticated
md~viduals with methods to cover their tracks. 166 For example, in
United States v. Hill, the court noted that "[t]he ease with which child
pornography images can be disguised - whether by renaming
sexyteenyboppersxxx.jpg as sundayschoollesson.doc, or something
more sophisticated
forecloses defendant's proposed search
methodology. "167
D.

Networked Computer Searches

_The law regulating the search of computer networks is more
straightforward: the Fourth Amendment's protection of a user's data
is :ery limited. T~is is due to the nature of computer networks,
which usually funct10n as a means of purposefully sharing data with
153
other users.
Each device on the network is "attached" to the others
and users use this connection to access shared data. 169 Although using

~ny~hing incriminating in nature, and that plain view justified the

fmdmg of pornography).
163.

!~-

a~ 1274-75 (finding the cabinet analogy inapplicable because the
files. were adequately labeled and the detective knew what each file
contamed and that he was exceeding the scope of the warrant).
164. Id. at 1275.
165. See Clancy, supra note 125, at 206-10.
166.
See id:, at _2?8 ("'Computer records are extremely susceptible to
tampermg, hidmg, or destruction, whether deliberate or inadvertent.'
Images can be hidden in all manner of files, even word processing
documents a~d sp~eadsheets. Criminals will do all they can to conceal
contra?and, mclu_dmg the simple expedient of changing the names and
extens10ns of files to disguise their content from the casual
observer.") (citation omitted).
167. 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
168.

See MICHAEL A. GALLO & WILLIAM M. HANCOCK, NETWORKING
~XPLAIN~D 12 (2nd ed. 2002) [hereinafter GALLO] ("Specifically, the term
networkmg refers to the concept of connecting a group of systems for
the expressed purpose of sharing information. The systems that are
connected form a network.").

169. See_ id. at ~-4 (explaining that a computer network is a "collection" of
devices, which extend beyond computers to printers, palm pilots, ect.,
that share resources by means of network "medium" and "protocol").
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a network does not immediately negate a user's expectation of
privacy, the knowledge that information transmitted on the ne~work
is not confidential and may be monitored reduces the expectat10n of
privacy. 170 Even when a user takes steps towar~s ~nsuring that his
files remain private, courts may find that the obJective component of
Katz still negates the expectation of privacy. 171 The loss of ?ne's
expectation of privacy usually occurs when the :iser has ~owmgly
exposed his files to the public and placed them m a locat10n where
others can access them. 172
Thus law enforcement may theoretically negate the warrant
requirem~nt and search a computer network by obtaining consent ?r
by the logic of the third party doctrine. Law enforcement may obtam
consent to search a network, for example, from a network
administrator employer, or, arguably a co-worker-anyone who has
'
.
L. aw
"joint occupancy"
and therefore
access to the data. 113
enforcement may still choose to seek a warrant; however, when given
the opportunity to surpass the burdensome requirement, _he will ~ikely
choose not to. On the other hand, the third party doctnne applies to
computer networks as well; the user has entrusted his data to a third
party network host, much like Hoffa entrusted his secrets to a

170. Cf. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2632-33 (201~)
(discussing that because Quon was_ explicitly . informed that his
employer-provided pager may be subject to audit, _he may. have no
expectation of privacy, but finding that the search did i:iot v10late the
Fourth Amendment on other grounds); see, e.g., Umted States v.
Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 20_07) (~oldi~g _that the
defendant still had a reasonable expectation of pnvacy m his files on a
network absent a policy outlining the active monitoring of the network).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2007)
("The government does not cor~test_ Ziegler's claim that he _had ,a
subjective expectation of privacy m his . . . computer . . . but Ziegler s
expectation of privacy in his office and workpla~e computer mus~ also be
seen as objectively reasonable."); see also Umted States v. Ki1:1~' 509
F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that when a user utilized a
computer network and knew that his documents were exposed to the
public, although he took steps to keep his files private, he no longer
retained a reasonable expectation of privacy).
172. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); see also United States v.
King, 509 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2007) (fi~ding tha~ society
would not recognize the network user's expectation of ~n".'a~y as
reasonable because his files were shared with thousands of mdividuals
who had access to the network).

173. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71(1974) (dismis~ing the
argument that the third party could not give consent, and holdmg that
consent was valid because she was a "joint occupant").
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.
warrant 's scope. 153 Th e court opmed
that the magistrate should
require the officers to state the type of files they sought in the
warrant, and that the search must be specifically limited to these
types of files. 164
The special approach, however, has also been criticized and
generally deemed useless and inappropriate to govern computer
165
searches. . , This criticism r~sides in the ease that criminals may
change a files n~m~ or extens10n to unrelated or unsuspicious topics,
~n~ t.hat thos~ crmimals who utilize computers are often sophisticated
md~viduals with methods to cover their tracks. 166 For example, in
United States v. Hill, the court noted that "[t]he ease with which child
pornography images can be disguised - whether by renaming
sexyteenyboppersxxx.jpg as sundayschoollesson.doc, or something
more sophisticated
forecloses defendant's proposed search
methodology. "167
D.

Networked Computer Searches

The law regulating the search of computer networks is more
straightforward: the Fourth Amendment's protection of a user's data
is very limited. This is due to the nature of computer networks
which usually function as a means of purposefully sharing data with
168
other users.
Each device on the network is "attached" to the others
and users use this connection to access shared data. 169 Although using
anything incriminating in nature, and that plain view justified the
finding of pornography).
163 · Id. at 1274-75 (finding the cabinet analogy inapplicable because the
"files" were adequately labeled and the detective knew what each file
contained and that he was exceeding the scope of the warrant).
164. Id. at 1275.
165. See Clancy, supra note 125, at 206-10.
166. See id:, at .2?8 ("'Computer records are extremely susceptible to
tampermg, hidmg, or destruction, whether deliberate or inadvertent.'
Images can be hidden in all manner of files, even word processing
documents and spreadsheets. Criminals will do all they can to conceal
contra_band, inclu_ding the simple expedient of changing the names and
extensions of files to disguise their content from the casual
observer.") (citation omitted).
167. 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
168. See MICHAEL A. GALLO & WILLIAM M. HANCOCK, NETWORKING
~XPLAIN~D ; (2nd ed. 2002) [hereinafter GALLO] ("Specifically, the term
networking refers to the concept of connecting a group of systems for
the expressed purpose of sharing information. The systems that are
connected form a network.").
169. See id. at 3-4 (explaining that a computer network is a "collection" of
devices, which extend beyond computers to printers, palm pilots, ect.,
that share resources by means of network "medium" and "protocol").

194

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET ·VOL.

4 ·No. I· 2012

Searching the Clouds

a network does not immediately negate a user's expectation of
privacy, the knowledge that information transmitted on the ne~work
is not confidential and may be monitored reduces the expectat10n of
privacy. 170 Even when a user takes steps towards ensuring that his
files remain private, courts may find that the objective component of
Katz still negates the expectation of privacy. 171 The loss of ?ne's
expectation of privacy usually occurs when the ~ser has ~owmgly
exposed his files to the public and placed them m a locat10n where
others can access them. 172
Thus law enforcement may theoretically negate the warrant
requirem~nt and search a computer network by obtaining consent ?r
by the logic of the third party doctrine. Law enforcement may obtam
consent to search a network, for example, from a network
administrator employer or, arguably a co-worker-anyone who has
'
.
L. aw
"joint occupancy"
and' therefore
access to the data. 173
enforcement may still choose to seek a warrant; however, when given
the opportunity to surpass the burdensome requirement, .he will ~ikely
choose not to. On the other hand, the third party doctrme applies to
computer networks as well; the user has entrusted his data to a third
party network host, much like Hoffa entrusted his secrets to a

170. Cf. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2632-33 (201~)
(discussing that because Quon was. explicitly . informed that his
employer-provided pager may be subject to audit, _he may. have no
expectation of privacy, but finding that the search did i:ot v10late the
Fourth Amendment on other grounds); see, e.g., Umted States v.
Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2~07) (~oldi~g .that the
defendant still had a reasonable expectation of privacy m his files on a
network absent a policy outlining the active monitoring of the network).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2007)
("The government does not co:r~test. Ziegler's claim that he .had ,a
subjective expectation of privacy m hrn . . . computer . . . but Ziegler s
expectation of privacy in his office and workpla~e computer mus~ also be
seen as objectively reasonable."); see also U mted States v. Kii:~' 509
F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that when a user utilized a
computer network and knew that his documents were exposed to the
public, although he took steps to keep his files private, he no longer
retained a reasonable expectation of privacy).
172. Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person
knowingly exposes to th~ public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); see also United State~ v.
King, 509 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (11th C~. 2007) (fi~ding tha~ society
would not recognize the network user s expectat10n of ~n".'a~y as
reasonable because his files were shared with thousands of mdividuals
who had access to the network).

173. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71(1974) (dismissing the
argument that the third party could not give consent, and holding that
consent was valid because she was a "joint occupant").
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government agent, and has misplaced his reliance that the third party
will not share his data with law enforcement. 174
A fundamental distinction exists between the cloud and computer
networks. A. computer network is not the Internet. 175 Typically,
when. a user is part of a computer network, he is aware that he
allowmg other network users access to his files and media and
therefore can plan what he saves and stores on the network
. 1 176 I
accor d mg y.
n the alternative, although a user may create a
personal "network" on the cloud by accessing his material from
multiple computers, tablets, and smartphones unless the user
knowingly invites others to join his "network," his files and media
177
remain private.
This difference makes it dangerous to compare the
cloud to a computer network for the purposes of determining Fourth
A~endm~nt ~rotections. F~r example, a Dropbox user has the ability
to share a file or folder with others. 178 However, if the user chooses
not to utilize this feature, his files remain private. 179 Even if the user
has installed the Dropbox application on multiple devices, he is the
only one who can access these files, provided that he has not shared
his passw~rd. with others. 180 Thus, because a user has not knowingly
exposed his files and media to a public network when using the cloud
he has not foregone his expectation of privacy in the same way ~
computer network user has.

IV.

SEARCHING THE CLOUD

The solution is simple.

If a law enforcement agent wishes to

se~rch the cloud, he must obtain a warrant; anything less than this
stnct requirement violates the Fourth Amendment and is
unconstitutional. A warrantless search and seizure of data from a
cloud network account is unreasonable.

174.

Hoffa v. United S~ates, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) ("[PJetitioner, in a
word, v:ras :z::ot relymg or: the security of the hotel room; he was relying
upon his misplaced confidence that [the third party] would not reveal
his wrongdoing.").

175. See GALLO, supra note 168, at 9.
176.
Id. at 2 (describing the purpose of a network is to share information
with others).
177.

See D!l?PBOX: TERMS OF SERVICE, https://www.dropbox.com/terms
(last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (explaining an optional feature that allows a
user to share his files with. others).

I~. ("The Services provide features that allow you to share your stuff
with others or to make it public.").
179. Id.
178.

Three points support the conclusion that a law enforcement agent
must be required to obtain a separate warrant. First, pursuant to
Katz there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud.
Seco~d, a warrant search of a computer does not extend to and
encompass the cloud. Third, any attempts to circumvent the warrant
requirement are unsupported by law.
A.

There Is an Expectation of Privacy in the Cloud

The Fourth Amendment protects cloud network accounts because
a user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud. This
protection is derived from the application of Katz's tw~-~art
reasonable expectation of privacy test; that the person has exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy ~n t~e area to be
searched and that expectation is one that society is prepared to
.
.
·
recognize' as reasonable (the objective
component ) .is1 A. companson
of
cloud computing to the protections afforded to, or stnpped from, the
mail and the garbage provide support for this conclusion. 182
.
.
First, the subjective aspect of Katz is satisfied. Users mamtam a
reasonable expectation of privacy in files saved on the cloud.
Primarily, this is because many cloud network users utilize it for
private, personal means: to either back up data or to store documents
in an easily accessible location. 183 Users do not assume that cloud
network providers will snoop in or share their files, and are concerned
when presented with a situation in which unauthorized or uninformed
access may occur .184
Comparably, the Supreme Court has routinely held t~at law
enforcement must seek a warrant before an agent is permitted to
search the contents of a piece of mail that a person has voluntarily
turned over to the third-party USPS. 185 In these types of situations,
although the sender places his letters and packages into ~he ha~ds of
a third party, he has not foregone his expectation of pnv~cy m the
contents of his mail. 186 The same concept may be applied to the
181. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
182. See supra Section III(A)(l) for a discussion of the reasonable
expectation of privacy in regards to the mail and the garbage.
183. Horrigan, supra note 10 (reporting the vari~us ways :isers )utilize the
cloud, which include storing personal photos, files, and videos .
184. Id. (reporting when those surveyed were given ways providers may ~se
their files, users "report[edJ high levels of concern when presen~ed with
scenarios in which companies may put their data to uses of which they
may not be aware").
185. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1978); United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970).
186. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 ("Letters and sealed pacdkages of ~his
kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination an inspect10n,
except as to their outward form and weight.") (emphasis added).

180. See id.
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government agent, and has misplaced his reliance that the third party
will not share his data with law enforcement. 174
A fundamental distinction exists between the cloud and computer
networks. A. computer network is not the Internet. 175 Typically,
when. a user is part of a computer network, he is aware that he
allowmg other network users access to his files and media and
therefore can plan what he saves and stores on the network
. 1 176 I
accor d mg y.
n the alternative, although a user may create a
personal "network" on the cloud by accessing his material from
multiple computers, tablets, and smartphones unless the user
knowingly invites others to join his "network," his files and media
177
remain private.
This difference makes it dangerous to compare the
cloud to a computer network for the purposes of determining Fourth
A~endm~nt ~rotections. F~r example, a Dropbox user has the ability
to share a file or folder with others. 178 However, if the user chooses
not to utilize this feature, his files remain private. 179 Even if the user
has installed the Dropbox application on multiple devices, he is the
only one who can access these files, provided that he has not shared
his passw~rd. with others. 180 Thus, because a user has not knowingly
exposed his files and media to a public network when using the cloud
he has not foregone his expectation of privacy in the same way ~
computer network user has.

IV.

SEARCHING THE CLOUD

The solution is simple.

If a law enforcement agent wishes to

se~rch the cloud, he must obtain a warrant; anything less than this
stnct requirement violates the Fourth Amendment and is
unconstitutional. A warrantless search and seizure of data from a
cloud network account is unreasonable.

174.

Hoffa v. United S~ates, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) ("[PJetitioner, in a
word, v:ras :z::ot relymg or: the security of the hotel room; he was relying
upon his misplaced confidence that [the third party] would not reveal
his wrongdoing.").

175. See GALLO, supra note 168, at 9.
176.
Id. at 2 (describing the purpose of a network is to share information
with others).
177.

See D!l?PBOX: TERMS OF SERVICE, https://www.dropbox.com/terms
(last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (explaining an optional feature that allows a
user to share his files with. others).

I~. ("The Services provide features that allow you to share your stuff
with others or to make it public.").
179. Id.
178.

Three points support the conclusion that a law enforcement agent
must be required to obtain a separate warrant. First, pursuant to
Katz there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud.
Seco~d, a warrant search of a computer does not extend to and
encompass the cloud. Third, any attempts to circumvent the warrant
requirement are unsupported by law.
A.

There Is an Expectation of Privacy in the Cloud

The Fourth Amendment protects cloud network accounts because
a user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud. This
protection is derived from the application of Katz's tw~-~art
reasonable expectation of privacy test; that the person has exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy ~n t~e area to be
searched and that expectation is one that society is prepared to
.
.
·
recognize' as reasonable (the objective
component ) .is1 A. companson
of
cloud computing to the protections afforded to, or stnpped from, the
mail and the garbage provide support for this conclusion. 182
.
.
First, the subjective aspect of Katz is satisfied. Users mamtam a
reasonable expectation of privacy in files saved on the cloud.
Primarily, this is because many cloud network users utilize it for
private, personal means: to either back up data or to store documents
in an easily accessible location. 183 Users do not assume that cloud
network providers will snoop in or share their files, and are concerned
when presented with a situation in which unauthorized or uninformed
access may occur .184
Comparably, the Supreme Court has routinely held t~at law
enforcement must seek a warrant before an agent is permitted to
search the contents of a piece of mail that a person has voluntarily
turned over to the third-party USPS. 185 In these types of situations,
although the sender places his letters and packages into ~he ha~ds of
a third party, he has not foregone his expectation of pnv~cy m the
contents of his mail. 186 The same concept may be applied to the
181. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
182. See supra Section III(A)(l) for a discussion of the reasonable
expectation of privacy in regards to the mail and the garbage.
183. Horrigan, supra note 10 (reporting the vari~us ways :isers )utilize the
cloud, which include storing personal photos, files, and videos .
184. Id. (reporting when those surveyed were given ways providers may ~se
their files, users "report[edJ high levels of concern when presen~ed with
scenarios in which companies may put their data to uses of which they
may not be aware").
185. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1978); United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970).
186. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 ("Letters and sealed pacdkages of ~his
kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination an inspect10n,
except as to their outward form and weight.") (emphasis added).

180. See id.
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cloud. A cloud user has placed his files and media into the hands of
the third-party cloud provider, and entrusts the third party will store
and provide access to the files, but does not expect the provider to
look at them.
Comparing the cloud network to the mail also provides another
piece of support for the subjective expectation of privacy. The
cont~nts of the mail receive Fourth Amendment protection, not the
physical envelope and address that have been exposed to the public
137
eye.
The security notifications Dropbox provides state that the
only information its employees have access to is the metadata which
is comprised of the file name and location. 188 This similarity p'rovides
direct support for the subjective expectation of privacy: users who
accept these policies and choose to use the particular cloud network
account based on these policies, have a reasonable subjective
expectation of privacy.
Katz's objective aspect, that society recognizes the expectation of
pri:ac~ as reasonable, is also satisfied through similar reasoning.
Objectively, the cloud differs from searching garbage because no risk
exists that once a user saves or "relinquishes" a file to a cloud
account, that snoops and scavengers will ravage it. In fact, to further
dis~inguish the cloud from the garbage, it is unlikely that anyone
besides the user may view the file because he has not digitally left it
out in the open the way the trash is left on the curb. 189 Thus, under
Greenwood, simply placing data in the hands of a provider does not
negate the expectation of privacy because others still may not obtain
it.
Further, the government has acknowledged that there is an
expectation of privacy in the contents of a physical hard drive, and
law enforcement has begun to include a computer on warrant
applications, obtain a second warrant when an unanticipated
computer is .located, or justify why the initial warrant covered
searching the computer .190 The cloud should be viewed in the same
manner, because the cloud network is just another location albeit an
off-site location, where a user will store data. Moreover,' if a user
believed that the government could access data saved on the cloud at
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any time, use of the cloud network would likely not be as prevalent.
To compare the cloud to the mail again, patrons of the USPS would
not surrender their mail as easily if they thought the government
could open and search any letter or package. Part of the USPS'
success is contingent upon the government understanding that
privacy rights must be respected. The same reasoning must be
applied to the cloud, and, in fact, already has been.
.
Therefore because Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test is
satisfied, the' answer to the initial hypothetical must be that law
enforcement is required to obtain a separate warrant. 191
B.

Warrants to Search a Hard Drive Do Not Include Searching the
Cloud

The Fourth Amendment protects a physical computer hard drive,
and several methods of computer search doctrine have evolved with
these protections in mind. . However, these search methodologies .are
contingent upon the files or media being saved on the. physical
computer, and cannot be extended to files that are stored directly on
the cloud. 192 Yet, each method offers some insight into why law
enforcement needs a separate warrant for searching a cloud network
account.
Arguably, the container view offers the most persuasive reason for
why a separate warrant is necessary. The container view, in term~ of
computer searches, is contingent on the principle that the. p~ysical
computer itself is the container; the law does not support definmg the
container as all of the user's computer data. 193 Thus, the warrant
would cover the data the user saved within the container, and in the
case of a computer, this data is saved on the computer's physical hard
drive. Documents that are saved in a cloud network account are not
located within the computer-container, and, furthermore, when a user
chooses to save data on the cloud, he is purposely choosing not to
place his data in a computer-container.
To provide further support, the law has alrea.dy started t? tr.end
For example, the Electromc Commumcat10ns
in this direction.
Privacy Act 194 and the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications

187. Id.

191. See supra Section I.

188. DROPBOX: SEC. TERMS, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited
Mar. 26, 2012) (Dropbox employees are prohibited from viewing the
conte.nt of fil~s y~u store in your Dropbox account, and are only
permitted to view file metadata (e.g., file names and locations).").

192. I acknowledge that some cloud programs, such as . Dropbox, save a_n
additional copy of document onto the user's hard dnve. Howev~r, this
changes the analysis regarding searching the ?loud network. !his Note
assumes that the user is using the cloud service as the exclusive means
to save their files and media, and there are no back-ups saved on the
computer hard drive.

189. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (describing one's
lowered expectation of privacy when they take the trash out).
190. See, ~·~·, United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270-71 (1999)
(explammg that law enforcement sought an additional warrant to search
unanticipated computers).
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193. See discussion supra Section III(C)(l).
194. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522
(2002)
(regulating the interception of· transmitted electronic
communications).
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cloud. A cloud user has placed his files and media into the hands of
the third-party cloud provider, and entrusts the third party will store
and provide access to the files, but does not expect the provider to
look at them.
Comparing the cloud network to the mail also provides another
piece of support for the subjective expectation of privacy. The
contents of the mail receive Fourth Amendment protection, not the
physical envelope and address that have been exposed to the public
187
eye.
The security notifications Dropbox provides state that the
only information its employees have access to is the metadata which
.
'
is comprised of the file name and location. 188 This similarity provides
direct support for the subjective expectation of privacy: users who
accept these policies and choose to use the particular cloud network
account based on these policies, have a reasonable subjective
expectation of privacy.
Katz's objective aspect, that society recognizes the expectation of
pri:ac~ as reasonable, is also satisfied through similar reasoning.
Objectively, the cloud differs from searching garbage because no risk
exists that once a user saves or "relinquishes" a file to a cloud
account, that snoops and scavengers will ravage it. In fact, to further
distinguish the cloud from the garbage, it is unlikely that anyone
besides the user may view the file because he has not digitally left it
out in the open the way the trash is left on the curb. 189 Thus, under
Greenwood, simply placing data in the hands of a provider does not
negate the expectation of privacy because others still may not obtain
it.
Further, the government has acknowledged that there is an
expectation of privacy in the contents of a physical hard drive, and
law enforcement has begun to include a computer on warrant
applications, obtain a second warrant when an unanticipated
computer is .located, or justify why the initial warrant covered
searching the computer .190 The cloud should be viewed in the same
manner, because the cloud network is just another location, albeit an
off-site location, where a user will store data. Moreover, if a user
believed that the government could access data saved on the cloud at
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any time, use of the cloud network would likely not be as prevalent.
To compare the cloud to the mail again, patrons of the USPS would
not surrender their mail as easily if they thought the government
could open and search any letter or package. Part of the USPS'
success is contingent upon the government understanding that
privacy rights must be respected. The same reasoning must be
applied to the cloud, and, in fact, already has been.
.
Therefore because Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test is
satisfied, the' answer to the initial .hypothetical must be that law
enforcement is required to obtain a separate warrant. 191
B.

Warrants to Search a Hard Drive Do Not Include Searching the
Cloud

The Fourth Amendment protects a physical computer hard drive,
and several methods of computer search doctrine have evolved with
these protections in mind. . However, these search methodologies .are
contingent upon the files or media being saved on the. physical
computer, and cannot be extended to files that are stored directly on
the cloud. 192 Yet, each method offers some insight into why law
enforcement needs a separate warrant for searching a cloud network
account.
Arguably, the container view offers the most persuasive reason for
why a separate warrant is necessary. The container view, in term~ of
computer searches, is contingent on the principle that the. p~ysical
computer itself is the container; the law does not support definmg the
container as all of the user's computer data. 193 Thus, the warrant
would cover the data the user saved within the container, and in the
case of a computer, this data is saved on the computer's physical hard
drive. Documents that are saved in a cloud network account are not
located within the computer-container, and, furthermore, when a user
chooses to save data on the cloud, he is purposely choosing not to
place his data in a computer-container.
To provide further support, the law has alrea.dy started t? tr.end
For example, the Electromc Commumcat10ns
in this direction.
Privacy Act 194 and the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications
191. See supra Section I.

187. Id.
188. DROPBOX: SEC. TERMS, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited
Mar. 26, 2012) (Dropbox employees are prohibited from viewing the
content of files you store in your Dropbox account, and are only
permitted to view file metadata (e.g., file names and locations).").
189. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (describing one's
lowered expectation of privacy when they take the trash out).
190. See, ~·~·, United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270-71 (1999)
(explammg that law enforcement sought an additional warrant to search
unanticipated computers).
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192. I acknowledge that some cloud programs, such as Dropbox, save a.n
additional copy of document onto the user's hard drive. Howev~r, this
changes the analysis regarding searching the ?loud network. !'his Note
assumes that the user is using the cloud service as the exclusive means
to save their files and media, and there are no back-ups saved on the
computer hard drive.
193. See discussion supra Section III(C)(l).
194. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522
(2002)
(regulating the interception of · transmitted electronic
communications).
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195

Act
inherently reject the view that a container encompasses
communication the user has not saved in the computer-container, as
these laws provide means of obtaining documents directly from a
remote server or communications provider. 196 These laws show that
Congress inherently recognizes that a user has the capability of using
multiple electronic storage containers, and that one warrant does not
cover all of them.
There is similar reasoning for why the sub-container method also
does not allow an officer who is conducting a warrant search to access
the cloud. If the sub-container view is applied to the computer, and
the search is regulated to folders or portions of the hard drive, two
197
things are evident.
First, the cloud is not a part of the hard drive,
and cannot be classified a sub-container of the hard drive. Second,
insofar as the cloud is considered a sub-container of the user's data
storage, a separate warrant, which lists the cloud storage specifically,
is necessary.
Similarly, "special" search restrictions also do not allow law
enforcement to search the cloud. If the magistrate applies special
restrictions to the search, such as limiting the search to only .JPG
files, the officer cannot use that warrant to search the cloud for the
.JPG files that may be located there. 198 The agent must continue to
abide by the· search parameters put forth in the particularity
requirements in the warrant, and must obtain a second warrant if he
feels the need to exceed the warrant's parameters.
Further support for the exclusion of the cloud under these
methodologies is derived from searches of physical premises. For
example, the law does not allow police to search for all physical
papers related to drugs, and then access a storage container across
town on the same warrant to search for more files related to drugs,
simply because the police have a warrant to search for the type of
document that may be stored there. 199 In this scenario, the police
must seek two warrants because the police have established two
separate sets of probable cause: first, probable cause to search the
house for the papers, and second, probable cause to search the storage
195. Stored Wire and Electronic Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 27012725 (2002) (regulating the search of stored electronic communications).
196. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b)(A), 2703(B)(i), 2703(B)(ii) (2002) (requiring a
subpoena or warrant to obtain documents from a remote computing
provider).
197. See discussion supra Section III(C)(2).
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200. 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012).
199. Cf. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (describing the
particularity requirements of a warrant, and noting that the warrant
must describe, with particularity, the place to be searched or the items
to be seized).
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195

Act
inherently reject the view that a container encompasses
communication the user has not saved in the computer-container, as
these laws provide means of obtaining documents directly from a
remote server or communications provider. 196 These laws show that
Congress inherently recognizes that a user has the capability of using
multiple electronic storage containers, and that one warrant does not
cover all of them.
There is similar reasoning for why the sub-container method also
does not allow an officer who is conducting a warrant search to access
the cloud. If the sub-container view is applied to the computer, and
the search is regulated to folders or portions of the hard drive, two
197
things are evident.
First, the cloud is not a part of the hard drive,
and cannot be classified a sub-container of the hard drive. Second,
insofar as the cloud is considered a sub-container of the user's data
storage, a separate warrant, which lists the cloud storage specifically,
is necessary.
Similarly, "special" search restrictions also do not allow law
enforcement to search the cloud. If the magistrate applies special
restrictions to the search, such as limiting the search to only . JPG
files, the officer cannot use that warrant to search the cloud for the
.JPG files that may be located there. 198 The agent must continue to
abide by the· search parameters put forth in the particularity
requirements in the warrant, and must obtain a second warrant if he
feels the need to exceed the warrant's parameters.
Further support for the exclusion of the cloud under these
methodologies is derived from searches of physical premises. For
example, the law does not allow police to search for all physical
papers related to drugs, and then access a storage container across
town on the same warrant to search for more files related to drugs,
simply because the police have a warrant to search for the type of
document that may be stored there. 199 In this scenario, the police
must seek two warrants because the police have established two
separate sets of probable cause: first, probable cause to search the
house for the papers, and second, probable cause to search the storage
195. Stored Wire and Electronic Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 27012725 (2002) (regulating the search of stored electronic communications).
196. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b)(A), 2703(B)(i), 2703(B)(ii) (2002) (requiring a
subpoena or warrant to obtain documents from a remote computing
provider).
197. See discussion supra Section III(C)(2).
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As Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test is satisfied, 204 the
Fourth Amendment protects the cloud, and a warrant exception does
not negate these protections. Thus, when a cloud network user saves
his data to his personal cloud account, for the limited purposes of
storing, protecting, and accessing his documents, he does not lose the
Fourth Amendment's protections because he has entrusted his
documents to a third party. Moreover, the privacy policies of cloud
providers like Dropbox, which advertise that the company may look
at documents for limited purposes, 205 does not implicate the thirdparty doctrine.
The law does not support stretching the third party doctrine to
negate the Fourth Amendment's protections of the cloud just to allow
law enforcement easier access to a user's stored data. The third party
doctrine was meant to apply to situations where a user purposely puts
information into the public sphere, foregoing his expectation of
privacy; for example, when a defendant knowingly speaks about his
criminal activities to a third party. 206 In Hoffa, the Court specified
that the defendant had taken the risk in choosing in whom to place
his trust, and had not been relying on the security of his hotel room,
which was a constitutionally protected area. 207 However, a cloud
network user is not taking the same type of risk; he is instead relying
on the security of the "room." The user has not disclosed the
contents of his files to the provider the way Hoffa told the informant
his secrets. Nor has the user, in most cases, disclosed the files by
creating a public network with others who may play a role analogous
to that of the government informant. Instead, the user relies on
Fourth Amendment protection via his expectation of privacy: he is in
a constitutionally protected area, and no law enforcement agent can
gain access to his room, or his cloud account, without a warrant.
Furthermore, returning to the mail analogy, a cloud network
provider acts similarly to the USPS, transporting data (mail) from
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204. See supra Section IV(A).
205. DROPBOX: SEC. TERMS, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited
Mar. 26, 2012) ("Like most online services, we ·have a small number of
employees who must be able to access user data for the reasons stated in
our privacy policy (e.g., when legally required to do so). But that's the
rare exception, not the rule. We have strict policy and technical access
controls that prohibit employee access except in these rare
circumstances.").
206. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966).
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As Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test is satisfied,204 the
Fourth Amendment protects the cloud, and a warrant exception does
not negate these protections. Thus, when a cloud network user saves
his .data to his. personal cloud account, for the limited purposes of
stormg, protectmg, and accessing his documents, he does not lose the
Fourth Amendment's protections because he has entrusted his
documents to a third party. Moreover, the privacy policies of cloud
providers like Dropb6x, which advertise that the company may look
at documents for limited purposes, 205 does not implicate the thirdparty doctrine.
The law does not support stretching the third party doctrine to
negate the Fourth Amendment's protections of the cloud just to allow
law e~forcement easier access to a user's stored data. The third party
?octrme .was ~eant to apply to situations where a user purposely puts
m~ormat10n mto the public sphere, foregoing his expectation of
pnvacy; for example, when a defendant knowingly speaks about his
criminal activities to a third party. 206 In Hoffa, the Court specified
t~at the defendant had taken the risk in choosing in whom to place
hrn trust, and had not been relying on the security of his hotel room
which was a constitutionally protected area. 207 However, a cloud
network user is not taking the same type of risk; he is instead relying
on the security of the "room." The user has not disclosed the
contents of his files to the provider the way Hoffa told the informant
his s~crets. N?r has the user, in most cases, disclosed the files by
creatmg a public network with others who may play a role analogous
to that of the government informant. Instead, the user relies on
Fourth Amendment protection via his expectation of privacy: he is in
a ~onstitutiona~y protected area, and no law enforcement agent can
gam access to his room, or his cloud account, without a warrant.
Furthermore, returning to the mail analogy, a cloud network
provider acts similarly to the USPS, transporting data (mail) from
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one location to another and holding it in the meantime. 208 If the
USPS is suspicious of a package and brings it to a law enforcement
agent's attention, and the agent wishes to look at the contents, he
must obtain a warrant. 209 In Van Leeuwen, the Supreme Court
clearly demonstrated that a third party's transportation or storage. of
somebody's materials does not automatically negate the expectation
of privacy. 2io Accordingly, the third party doctrine does not negate
the expectation of privacy, and therefore does not negate the warrant
requirement.
.
Moreover a cloud network provider is not the type of entity that
'
may grant consent
for law enforcement to . search its user ' s account .
For a third party to grant law enforcement access to the files, one
characteristic must be present: joint ownership or control over the
area to be searched. 211 In the case of an internal computer network,
typically, a second factor is also involved: the person whose .ar~a is
being searched has knowingly placed something, whether it is a
physical file or computer data, into the public eye. 212 Consequently,
law enforcement often can surpass the warrant requirement when
searching a computer network because a user has ~owi~gly placed
his data into the public eye, where other users can VIew it, and the
user also knows that there is joint ownership or control over the
network, as a network administrator often runs and polices network
use.213
In the case of the cloud, neither of these factors is present. First,
cloud i:ietwork users and providers do not have joint ownership and
control over a cloud network user's data; in fact, the user regains
control over his materials. 214 The cloud network provider is merely a
208. See Ex Parle Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (describing h~w the
federal mail service carries mail and the constitutional implications of
their temporary possession).
209. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970) (upholding .law
enforcement's detention of the package for the time reasonable to gam a
warrant).

204. See supra Section IV(A).
205. DROPBOX: SEC. TERMS, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited
Mar. 26, 2012) ("Like most online services, we ·have a small number of
employees who must be able to access user data for the reasons stated in
our privac~ policy (e.g., when legally required to do so). But that's the
rare except10n, not the rule. We have strict policy and technical access
controls that prohibit employee access except in these rare
circumstances.").

210. Cf. id. (not negating reasonableness factor of the timing issue because of
a warrant exception).

211. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment's general prohibition of warrantless entry of a
person's home does not apply where voluntary consent has been
obtained).
212. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.

206. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966).

213 .. See id.; see also supra Section III(B)(2).

207. Id. at 302 ("[P]etitioner, in _a word, was not relying on the security of
th~ hotel room; he was relymg upon his misplaced confidence that [the
thrrd party] would not reveal his wrongdoing.").

e· g.,
DROPBOX:
TERMS
OF
SERVICE,
214. S ee,
) ("Y
https://www.dropbox.com/terms (last visited Mar. 26, 201~
ou
retain full ownership to your stuff. We don't claim any ownership to any
of it.").
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CONCLUSION:

GET A WARRANT
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1
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'
en1orcement agent's xt t
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215. See, e.g., id. ("You are solely re
.bl £
of your files and folders and spons1 e or _YOl1:r conduct, the content
using the Services.").
'
your commumcat1ons with others while
216. But see Rodriguez, at 188-189 (1990) (" h
[of the search] could conceivabl be
h the surrounding circumstances
doubt its truth and not act y
~tuc . ~ at a reasonable person would
other factual determination~po~ I . wit out further inquiry. As with
determination of consent to enter ean~~' u~on searc~ and seizure,
standard: would the facts availab:u: ~e JUd.ged agamst an objective
'warrant a man of reasonable caution i~ t e off~ce; "at the moment. . .
party had authority over the premises?").the belief that the consenting
217. United States v Compreh
. D
(9th Cir. 2010) (en bane). ens1ve rug Testing, Inc., 621F.3d1162, 1176
218. Id. at 1177.

search pursuant to the first warrant, the agent has established
probable cause to support a warrant application to search the
suspect's cloud account. Thus, after his warrant is reviewed and
possibly granted, he may either show the warrant to the suspect and
request, politely, that he be given access to the cloud account, or he
may bring the warrant to the cloud network provider and obtain the
data, or means to access the data, directly from them.
These simple steps provide law enforcement with a clear-cut rule
regarding cloud network searches and seizures. Courts then must
make known to law enforcement that the Fourth Amendment
protects the cloud by refusing to grant overly broad warrants and by
suppressing evidence that law enforcement obtains from the cloud
when it is a result of an unreasonable search or seizure.
Society already recognizes that the Fourth Amendment protects
the cloud, and the law must respect this protection. For example,
many people believe that their materials in the cloud are protected,
and would be outraged if their cloud network service provider simply
turned their documents over without informing them. 219 Even major
companies are calling for an overhaul of online privacy law. 220
Therefore, the current legislation and departmental policies that have
trended towards requiring additional warrants for cloud network
searches, instead of unconstitutionally negating the requirement all
together, must continue to evolve. Law enforcement agencies must
adopt guidelines like those described in the Department of Justice's
guide, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic
Evidence in Criminal Investigations, 221 which urges local agencies to
adopt an operational policy that requires agents to obtain a second
warrant when the data they seek is stored elsewhere in the country. 222
Further, the legislation must recognize the Fourth Amendment's
protections of the cloud by refusing to codify the procedure for
searches of a cloud network account pursuant to anything less than a
warrant based on probable cause.
219. Horrigan, supra note 10 (reporting high levels of concern from cloud
network users when asked about how they would feel if the cloud
network provider took various actions with their data).
220. See, e.g., DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org (last
visited Oct. 30, 2012) (for information about the organization, its goals,
and a list of its current members).
221. Office of Legal Educ. & Exec. Office for United States Attorneys,
Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in
Criminal
Investigations,
vii
(2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf
(noting that the guide is not binding, and is simply meant to be used as
guidelines) .
222. Id. at 90 ("If the agent comes across evidence of a crime that is not
identified by the warrant, it may be safe practice to obtain a second
warrant.").
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holding box, and typically does not access or look at a user's data
:Vithout permission, nor does the provider police what the user places
~n. the accoun~ by examining every file. 215 This is not the same type of
Jomt ownership and control that occurs in consent cases where two
people are living together and sharing the space. 2 rn ' The cloud
provider merely provides the space and that is all. Therefore, the
second factor closely ties into the first. A cloud network user has not
knowingly exposed his data to the public the way that somebody who
is using a business computer network has. Unless the cloud network
user chooses to knowingly share his files with other users the user is
engaged in personal and private use of the cloud. In 'a computer
network or consent search case, the user knowingly places his files
where others can access them. This is not the case with the cloud.
Thus, because a warrant exception does not negate the warrant
requirement, the answer to the hypothetical remains the same.

V.

CONCLUSION:

GET A WARRANT

The Ninth Circuit in Comprehensive Drug Testing noted in dicta
that "[':]here computers are not near each other, but are ~onnected
electromcally, the original search might justify examining files in
computers many miles away, on a theory that incriminating electronic
data could have been shuttled and concealed there. The advent of
fast, cheap networking has made it possible to store information at
remote third~party locations[.]" 217 The Ninth Circuit then recognized
tha~ r.equestmg th.at people not utilize current technology to store
their files and media was "no answer," as it "is no longer a peculiarity
or luxury of the very rich; it's a way of life. "21s
The Fourth Amendment protects, and must continue to protect,
the cloud network. In the hypothetical discussed at the beginning of
this Note, the law enforcement agent's next step would be to obtain a
second warrant to search the suspect's cloud account. Through his
215.

216.

217.

search pursuant to the first warrant, the agent has established
probable cause to support a warrant application. to s.earch the
suspect's cloud account. Thus, after his warrant is reviewed and
possibly granted, he may either show the warrant to the suspect and
request, politely, that he be given access to the cloud account,. or he
may bring the warrant to the cloud network provider and obtam the
data or means to access the data, directly from them.
These simple steps provide law enforcement with a clear-cut rule
regarding cloud network searches and seizures. Courts then must
make known to law enforcement that the Fourth Amendment
protects the cloud by refusing to grant overly broad warrants and by
suppressing evidence that law enforcement obt~ins from the cloud
when it is a result of an unreasonable search or seizure.
Society already recognizes that the Fourth Amendment protects
the cloud and the law must respect this protection. For example,
many pe~ple believe that their materials in the c~oud are. prot~cted,
and would be outraged if their cloud network service provider s1m~ly
turned their documents over without informing them. 219 Even maJor
.
l aw. 220
companies are calling for an overhaul of onIine ~r~vacy
Therefore, the current legislation and departmental policies that have
trended towards requiring additional warrants for clou.d network
searches, instead of unconstitutionally negating the reqmre~ent all
together, must continue to evolve. Law enforcement agencies i:iu~t
adopt guidelines like those described in the Departn:er_it of Justice .s
guide, Searching and Seizing Computers . and Obtaining Elec~ronzc
Evidence in Criminal Jnvestigations, 221 which urges local .agencies to
adopt an operational policy that requires agents to obtam a second
warrant when the data they seek is stored elsewhere in the country. 2~ 2
Further, the legislation must recognize the .Fourth Amendments
protections of the cloud by refusing to codify the procedure for
searches of a cloud network account pursuant to anything less than a
warrant based on probable cause.

See, e.g., id. ("You are solely responsible for your conduct, the content
of your files and folders, and your communications with others while
using the Services.").

219. Horrigan, supra note 10 (reporting high levels of concern. from cloud
network users when asked about how they would feel if the cloud
network provider took various actions with their data).

But see Rodriguez, at 188-189 (1990) ("the surrounding circumstances
[of the .search] could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would
doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry. As with
other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure
determination of consent to enter must "be judged against an objectiv~
~tandard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . .
warrant a man ~f reasonable caution in the belief' "that the consenting
party had authority over the premises?").

220. S
(last
ee, e.g., DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org
h
. t"
"t
1
visited Oct. 30, 2012) (for information about t e orgamza 10n, I s goa s,
and a list of its current members).

United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176
(9th Cir. 2010) (en bane).

221. Office of Legal Educ. & Exec. Office for United Stat~s A~torney~,
Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic. Evidence in
Criminal
Investigations,
vii
(2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercri~e/~ocs/ssmanual2009.pdf

(noting that the guide is not binding, and is simply meant to be used as
guidelines) .
222. Id. at 90 ("If the agent comes across evidence ?f a crime .that is not
identified by the warrant, it may be safe practice to obtam a second
warrant.").

218. Id. at 1177.
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Until law enforcement routinely recognizes the Fourth
Amendment protects the cloud network, an additional added
protection is to continue to allow magistrates to impose restrictions
on comp~ter ':arrants.. Magistrates can do this by strictly enforcing
the particulanty reqmrement and by placing strict parameters on
comput~r warrants. If a magistrate grants a warrant for a computer
hard drive, he should specifically note that the search cannot expand
onto the cloud. Then, if the agent oversteps his bounds, the defense
may use the warrant's imposed limitations to suppress any data seized
unlawfully from the cloud. Restrictions such as limiting the search
parameters to the physical hard drive, requiring searches to be
conducted on copies of the hard drive instead of the actual computer
or requiring that search of the computer takes place off-line223 will
prevent law enforcement from even "accidently" exceeding the bounds
of t~e. warrant.
If magistrates clearly and consistently apply
re~tnct10~s to computer search warrants and suppress unlawfully
~eized evidence from the cloud, law enforcement will get the message:
if they want to go beyond the physical hard drive, they must obtain a
separate warrant.
These additional steps will not interfere with law enforcement's
ability to continue to perform effective searches and seizures. Users of
the cloud network have not given up their expectation of privacy
simply because they choose to use the best means of data storage
available. When the user has not shared the documents through a
network beyond one he has created for himself, he has not exposed
the documents to the public and maintains his reasonable expectation
of privac~. .The law must recognize this and must be willing to
develop cntena for the expectation of privacy to meet the demands of
the evolving technological world.
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SAYING THE SPOTIFY REVOLUTION:
RECALIBRATING THE POWER
IMBALANCE IN DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
E. Jordan Teague 1

ABSTRACT
Many believed that Spotify woul:1 revo.lutionize the music
industry, offering a legal alternative to file shanng that compensates
musicians for use of their digital music. Why, then, have artists b~en
abandoning the Spotify revolution in droves? Becau~e the revolut10n
has a dark side. Since Spotify is partly-owned by maJor .record la~el~,
it has a serious conflict of interest with independent artists. Spot1fy s
lack of transparency about its financial flows gi~es. musician~ fur~her
reason to question whether the service has their mtere.sts m mm~,
particularly in light of the microsc?~ic royalties Spotify ha~ paid
artists to date. This climate of susp1c10n has caused many artrn.ts. to
abandon the service and pursue alternative means of d1g1.tal
distribution and promotion.
Even listeners ha:e begun ~eavmg
Spotify on account of how it treats artists. Iromca~ly, Sp~t1fy has
managed to alienate the very audiences it need~ as allies: artists, who
supply Spotify's "unlimited" song library;. ~nd listeners, who fund
service through subscriptions and advertismg. ~s such, the Spo~1fy
revolution is destined to fail-an unfortunate reality, as the streammg
music business model has great potential to benefit artists and serve
the underlying goals of copyright.
.
.
I argue that the most effective way to save the .sp?t1fy revolut10n
is through a compulsory licensing scheme. This IS bec~use. t~e
primary impediment to Spotify changing it~ treatr:ient of artists is its
insulation from competitive pressures, which ultimately stems from
the major labels' formidable bargaining position in digital .soui:d
recordings. The labels have assumed a. ga~ekeeping function m
streaming music, demanding corporate eqmty m. exchan?e for access
to their sound recordings, which every streammg service. needs ~o
build a comprehensive catalog. As a result, the streammg music
market has very few participants, all of which are partially controlled

t?e

1.

223. In some cases, data saved in a cloud network account is not accessible
from a device that is off-line.
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